

REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA



PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT OFFICE (PMO)

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

**CIVIL SERVICE REFORM PROGRAMME
(CSRP)
2018-2027 STRATEGY**

JULY 2017

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AfDB	Africa Development Bank
BSC	Balanced Score Card
CB	Capacity Building
CSR	Civil Service Reform
CSRP	Civil Service Reform Programme Strategy
CwCs	Compacts with Citizens
DFID	Department for International Development
DPs	Development Partners
ERMS	Electronic Records Management System
FAO	World Food and Agriculture Organization
GCCI	Gambia Chamber of Commerce and Industry
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GOTG	Government of The Gambia
HPAEs	Highly-Performing Asian Economies
HR	Human Resource
HRMIS	Human Resource Management Information Systems
ICT	Information, Communication and Technology
IDF	Institutional Development Fund
IFMIS	Integrated Financial Management Information System
KPIs	Key Performance Indicators
MDAs	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MDI	Management Development Institute
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOFEA	Ministry of Finance & Economic Affairs
MOICI	Ministry of Information Communication and Infrastructure
MoLRG	Ministry of Lands and Regional Government
NDP	National Development Plan
OSG	Office of the Secretary General
PAGE	Programme for Accelerated Growth and Employment
PFMR	Public Financial Management Reform
PIUs	Project Implementation Units
PMO	Personnel Management Office
PMS	Performance Management System
PPPs	Public Private Partnerships
PSC	Public Service Commission
PSRICDB	Public Service Reform and Institutional Capacity Development Board
SDPs	Sector Development Programmes
SDT	Strategy Development Team
SSHFC	Social Services and Housing Finance Corporation
SWAps	Sector wide approaches
SWOT	Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats
TANGO	The Association of Non-Governmental Organizations
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNDP	United Nations Development Program

1 Introduction

1.1 Background and strategy development process

The Republic of The Gambia had a Civil Service Reform Programme for the period 2012-2015 (CSRP 2012-2015). Prior to that, there was a CSRP 2008-2011 that was a successor to other less structured civil service reform (CSR) initiatives. The Government of The Gambia (GOTG) is cognizant of the fact that considerable further efforts are required before the country has a civil service that has the capacity and performance to support attainment and sustenance of the national socio-economic transformation goals as promulgated in our national development visions. Accordingly, Government has determined that another phase of CSR, which will last about a decade, beginning 2018, is necessary.

The Personnel Management Office (PMO) under the Office of the President has the mandate and responsibility to spearhead development of CSRP 2018-2027. It has been leading in the design and implementation of the legacy CSR programmes. To inform the design of the CSRP 2018-2027, PMO has commissioned an independent evaluation of the CSRP 2012-2015. It has also tasked a team of senior Government officers to spearhead a participatory development of the CSRP 2018-2027 strategy. The schedule of civil servants who have supported the development of the strategy is in Annex 1. This team has benefited from the comparative knowledge of consultant availed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) mission in The Gambia.

The development of the CSRP 2018-2027 Strategy began with a stakeholders' strategy development forum, which was held on 22nd October 2015. This forum brainstormed on: the current strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to civil service capacity and performance in a forward looking perspective; the major issues and challenges facing the civil service; and the vision, strategic objectives, strategies and strategic initiatives for the reform of the service. The participants of that forum have spearheaded this strategy development process (see **Appendix 1**). To the same end, the PMO commissioned the evaluation of the CSRP 2012-2015; circulated questionnaires to representatives of various stakeholders; and organised key informant interviews to inform both the evaluation of the CSRP 2012-2015 and the design of this CSRP 2018-2027 strategy. A major stakeholders' forum was held to validate the strategy document.

1.2 National economic and development context

The National Vision goals set by the Government of The Gambia (GOTG) are ambitious. In line with our national development visions and plans GOTG has planned for the country to attain a middle-income status and to achieve full transformation by 2027. The Gambia's economy will be transformed by developing the country as a competitive destination of international investment, tourists and financial services tourism. To those ends, it is critical that The Gambia achieves and sustains: a high rate of economic and employment, improved policy and regulatory environment for private investment; and enhanced quality of public services through the next decade.

These long term strategic goals are articulated in our national development plan which aimed to deliver Good Governance and Accountability, Social Cohesion and National Reconciliation and a Revitalized and Transformed Economy for well-being of all Citizens.

It is noteworthy that the wider national economic environment was on a downward trend in the period of the CSRP 2012-2015 implementation. The Gambia was still reeling from the impact of the major drought of 2011 at the time of the design and launch of programme. During the design of the programme, which was in tandem with the PAGE medium term plan of the same period, there was optimism that in 2012 there would be both an end to the drought and economic recovery. Unfortunately, the situation worsened in the years that followed. According to the 2014 PAGE evaluation (Republic of The Gambia, 2014a), "In The Gambia, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita rose to a peak of US\$ 460 in 2010 from 420 in 2005, an increase of 9.5 percent. Subsequently, per capita incomes declined every year by 21 percent to \$366 in 2013, wiping out twice the level of gains registered before the 2011 drought. This decline was accentuated by the decline of the performance of the tourism industry arising from a regional spillover of the impact of the Ebola outbreak in other countries of West Africa in 2013. The external shocks coupled with spending pressures mainly in energy and health sectors diluted the growth performance in 2014 from a prospective 5.5% to just 2% (MOFEA, Budget Speech 2015). Still, according to the same source, GOTG recorded exemplary performance in poverty reduction and improving food security for the citizens in 2014, when the World Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) conferred the award of early attainment of the MDG target on food security to GOTG. Moreover, improved GDP growth, about 4.7%, was forecasted for 2015.

It is nonetheless important and urgent that civil service reform and other structural reforms that can support our national development goals are vigorously pursued. The Republic of The Gambia is faced with challenges of unacceptably high levels of poverty and youth unemployment, comparatively low quality of public service delivery. In this regard, for example, an assessment of the economy by the IMF in September 2015 observed major macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances, and recommended urgent measures to realize a deep restructuring of the budget beginning in 2016. Among the recommended measures, which relate to CSR are the following:

- (a) Streamlining the size of the public sector, including but not limited to a reduction of the number of ministries and government agencies;
- (b) Implementing comprehensive civil service reforms to reduce substantially the number of personnel in the central administration and government agencies, and hence the wage bill beginning in 2016;
- (c) Developing and strictly enforcing a new public service vehicles acquisition, use and maintenance policy;
- (d) Further downsizing diplomatic missions in addition to that implemented in 2015; and
- (e) Streamlining the country's membership in non-financial international organizations.

1.3 National Development Visions, Plans and civil service reform nexus

The critical role of civil service reform (CSR) in the pursuit of The Gambia's development goals cannot be overemphasized. The availability of certain skills and competencies is critical to effective

performance of strategic functions, and timely, efficient and effective implementation of development programmes and quality public services delivery as planned in the NDP. The role of a capable and effective civil service in national transformation is underscored by lessons of experience from the Highly-Performing Asian Economies (HPAEs) as captured by a World Bank team (see **Box 1.1** below).

Box 1.1: The Critical Role of the Public Service in the successes of Highly Performing Asian Economies (HPAEs)

The success of the East Asian Economies stems partly from the policies they have adopted and partly from the institutional mechanisms they created to implement them. All of the HPAEs created secure institutional environments for private investment that led to very high levels of private sector-led growth. HPAE civil services range from the highly meritocratic and insulated bureaucracies of Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, China, to the less effective and less insulated public administrations of Indonesia and Thailand. Nevertheless, each of these economies has had a core of technocratic executives driving the implementation of the reforms. In Indonesia and Thailand, their scope was limited to management of the macro-economy. In the other HPAEs, competent civil services administered a much wider range of policy instruments.

How did these economies create a reputable bureaucracy? First, pay mattered. The salaries of bureaucrats (except in Singapore) usually fell short of those for equivalent positions in the private sector, but they were sufficiently high to attract and retain good economic managers. Second, in the HPAEs with high-quality bureaucracies, rules and procedures governing public sector employment were institutionalized and insulated from political interventions. In particular, recruitment and promotion were merit based. Third, public employment was accorded high status. These factors improved the quality of the bureaucracy, discouraged corruption, and created an esprit de corps among civil servants that helped insulate the bureaucracy from political pressures.

Source: The World Bank Policy Research Report (1993): The East Asian Miracle, Economic Growth and Public Policy, Oxford University Press, pg.352-3

There is anecdotal evidence that Gambia's civil service is experiencing short supply of professional and technical personnel. At the same time, it has been observed that a high rate of staff changes and exits is negatively impacting on efforts to build and sustain civil service capacity for policy analysis, and regulatory, professional and technical services delivery. Furthermore, deficiencies and pathologies of the civil service (including red tape, lethargy, corruption and other unethical practices) ultimately and pervasively impact on whether or not the service enables or disenables the non-governmental sectors, including the private sector, in making their due contribution to the country's socio-economic development, and even delivery of public services. Therefore, if the Gambia civil service cannot attract and retain a critical mass of highly skilled and experienced senior administration executives (managers), technical and professional personnel, it is unlikely that the national development visions can be achieved and sustained.

According to a 2012 joint assessment of the Africa Development Bank (AfDB) and the World Bank, a major challenge in its implementation was "Limited public sector capacity remains a significant source

of constraint in the Gambia, which has significant implications for service delivery and citizen satisfaction [and] These constraints are rooted in structural issues reaching beyond the mere technical skill sets of core public sector managers, notably the way the management of public affairs is conducted, the incentive structure and the nature and adequacy of competencies in the civil service". Thus the assessment concluded that "in the short to medium term, a focus on the efficient management of human resources within the civil service, including the recruitment and retention of personnel should be a first priority".

1.4 Lessons of experience from legacy civil service reform programmes

1.4.1 Overview

The independent evaluation of Gambia's CSRP 2012-2015 has observed that successful implementation of the civil service reform (CSR) has eluded GOTG not just in the current but also in the previous (CSRP 2008-2011) phase. That evaluation also pointed out that in that experience, among the community of developing countries, Gambia's was not exceptional; in that there is extensive literature over the past one and half decades confirming that CSR is a daunting task in both design and implementation. The World Bank comprehensive evaluation of public sector reform projects it had supported in developing countries between 1999 and 2006 confirmed that civil service reform is more complex and has fewer chances of satisfactory design and implementation than such other reforms as public financial management reform (PFMR), anti-corruption programs, etc. (World Bank 2008). Brosamle K.J. (2012:3) suggests that, besides dearth of relevant comparative knowledge and data, "The political sensitivity of CSR, its close interdependencies with the 'corruption issue', and its often large-scale fiscal sustainability implications add further difficulty" in the choice of CSR reforms and institutional designs. Rao S. (2013:13) in preparing a topic guide for CSR underscores the imperative to understanding the interplay between public organizations and the surrounding social, political, historical and culture contexts in design and implementation of CSR. To the latter, the consultant suggests the inclusion of the country's macroeconomic and fiscal context, and availability of both financial and technical resources. It is with such comparative knowledge and perspectives that the lessons learnt from the evaluation of the Gambia's CSRP 2012-2015 are expounded below under the following headings:

- Broad ownership and commitment to reform among key stakeholders is critical;
- Reforms to which national leadership directly commits have high prospects of successful implementation;
- A holistic and long term strategic perspective is necessary;
- Planned activities should be prioritized and sequenced in line with capacities; and
- Complementary reforms should be acknowledged and coordinated.

1.4.2 Broad ownership and commitment to reform among key stakeholders is critical

It is apparent that if there was commitment to implementation of CSRP 2012-2015 beyond PMO, more and better results from implementation would have been realized. The implementation management structure of the program was never operationalized. This can only be explained by lack of sense of

ownership and commitment to participate and support the implementation of the program by the MDAs from which membership of the organs of the structure were derived. The MDAs in this case, in the main, represented institutions at the centre of Government including: the Cabinet Office/Office of the Secretary General, MOFEA and the PSC. Cooperation and collaboration of MDAs at the Centre of Government is crucial. Thus, for example, the broader ownership of the civil servants loan scheme has enabled its sustained implementation in spite of budgetary constraints.

Broad ownership and commitment to CSR is also important in order to readily overcome potential resistance to the reforms. CSR entails a range of activities that are, firstly, are likely to impact on positions, mandates and authority, careers and incentives of many entities and individuals across the Government. Therefore, CSR as a change process is bound to evoke varying degrees of scepticism and resistance among various constituencies and individuals in the service. Secondly, successful implementation requires the participation of many MDAs and individual officers. Unless the officers in these other MDAs are enabled to participate early in the design of the program and commit to its implementation, lack of interest and inertia will ultimately deny momentum to the implementation of the program.

1.4.3 Reforms to which national leadership directly commits have high prospects of successful implementation

The original design of CSRP 2012-2015 did not include the intervention of the civil servants loan scheme (see Box 1.1). However, today, among the key informants on evaluation of the reform program, the loan scheme is the most celebrated of the reform interventions. It is noteworthy that the scheme is funded from the GOTG budget allocations. It is also noteworthy that following a Cabinet Retreat decision in mid-2014, an inter-agency Task Force was commissioned to work on the modalities of increases in civil service salaries and pensions. That Task Force came up with far reaching policy recommendations that would advance the CSRP agenda in these areas. Both episodes cited here serve to underscore the fact that the reforms that the national leadership commits to have high prospects of successful implementation.

1.4.4 A holistic and long term strategic perspective is necessary

It is evident that the far reaching changes already initiated, such as pay and pensions reform will not be readily and fully implementable in the short to medium term because the underlying problems have a long history, and there are serious technical, fiscal and socio-political constraints to implementation.

The work of 2014 Task Force on reform of civil service pay and pension reforms underscores the importance of adopting a holistic and long term perspective in addressing major civil service reform issues. Civil servants have had no salary adjustment for more than six years. The Task Force identified that in addressing the issue, there are many cross-cutting issues to be considered in identifying appropriate and sustainable reform measures. Furthermore, the kind of painful policy measures recommended by the 2014 Task Force on the issue are evidently not readily forthcoming. In a more general sense, experience with CSRPs in the Gambia over the past decade confirms that the changes

pursued will be realized in the long term. Little progress was made with implementation of CSRP 2008-2011, and major gaps remain with that of the 2012-2015 program.

1.4.5 Planned activities should be prioritized and sequenced in line with capacities

Inadequate financial support and limited technical capabilities have been dominant factors underlying uneven implementation and limited results of the CSRP 2008-2011 and CSRP 2012-2015. To avoid this fate for the future phases of CSR, it is important that any planned activities are carefully prioritized and sequenced on the basis of a realistic assessment of potential availability of financial resources and technical capacity to support implementation.

1.4.6 Complementary reforms should be coordinated

It has been suggested that some components of the CSRP 2012-2015 would have had traction and higher prospects for sustained implementation and results if their design and implementation plans were coordinated with those of other reforms. In particular, it was pointed out that CSR interventions in strategic planning by MDAs, performance management and service delivery improvements should have been designed and planned for implementation in coordination with budget reforms. Then, such CSRP components as performance management and service delivery, which were not implemented at all would most probably taken-off even without development partners funding for them under the CSRP 2012-2015. Therefore, it is important that design and implementation of CSRP takes due cognizance of the prospects and advantages of coordinating with complementary reforms in such areas as PFMR and Anti-Corruption programs.

1.5 Strategic imperatives for successful reform

1.5.1 Overview

Against the backdrop of the lessons learnt from the implementation of CSRP 2012-2015, and with the benefit of comparative knowledge and experience derived from studies of design and implementation of similar reforms in other countries, five strategic imperatives in the design and implementation strategy for CSRP 2018-2027 are described below under the following headings:

- (i) Reform must be broadly embraced across Government;
- (ii) Priority focus on “Getting the Basics Right”;
- (iii) Phasing, prioritizing and sequencing in a long-term perspective;
- (iv) Rapid building of implementation capacity;
- (v) Reform must clearly impact on national development and public service delivery; and
- (vi) Proactive coordination, monitoring and evaluation of implementation.

1.5.2 Reform must be broadly embraced across Government

For the CSRP to be implemented with necessary rigor and continuity, and to achieve traction and yield discernible and sustainable outcomes over time, it must, firstly, be embraced by the national political leadership, beginning with the Cabinet. Also, the top executives in the civil service (permanent secretaries, Deputy PSs, Directors, etc.) should own and proactively champion the reforms, and take full and direct responsibility for implementation and accountability. This was recognized in CSRP 2012-2015 design, and an apparently robust implementation management structure designed (Figure 3.1), but it was not operationalized. That gap should not be allowed in finalizing the design and launching the implementation of the CSRP 2018-2027 strategy.

It is also important that all civil servants at various levels are made aware of the reform objectives and implementation strategy. In the case of CSRP 2012-2015, few civil servants, even senior ones, were aware of the program. For the CSRP 2018-2027, a program of Information, Education and Communication (IEC), incorporating elements of change management, should be rolled out to all MDAs in the early months following the launch of implementation. Meanwhile, the design process should enable as much wider participation across Government and other stakeholders as possible.

1.5.3 Priority focus on “Getting the Basics Right”

The design of CSRP 2012-2015 was somewhat over ambitious in that some of the target processes, activities and outputs smacked of the state of the art management practices. Such practices include: use of the Balanced Score Card (BSC) in strategic planning, implementation of a modern performance management system, use of citizen’s charters, etc. However, it is now common experience that such model approaches in civil service reform will only work if the basic foundations for a civil service administration are already in place. Thus, for example, before introducing a BSC, it would be important that strategic planning is juxtaposed in a simple but effective results-based medium term planning and budgeting system. Also as an example, for improved human resource management, the basic tasks are to establish what work needs to be done, what jobs are needed to carry out this work, and the level of pay that is appropriate for each job. This provides the basis for selecting staff on merit through appropriate recruitment and promotion practices. Having public servants in post who meet the basic requirements of their jobs and are adequately paid is a necessary first step before attempting to manage their performance or to invest in their development. This is what it is entailed in “Getting the Basics Right”.

1.5.4 Phasing, prioritizing and sequencing in a long-term perspective

GOTG has already decided on the efficacy of adopting a long-term (10-year) perspective in the design and implementation of the next phase of the CSRP. In this perspective, the reform design will be necessarily comprehensive. This is consistent with widely-acknowledged good practice in the design of CSR strategies and programmes. However, in the literature on reforms, comprehensive reform programmes are considered inappropriate in many developing countries for several reasons. Firstly, they lack the capability and the will, at both the political and bureaucratic level, to lead, manage and sustain a complex reform programme. Secondly, although different elements are related, there may be

opportunities to create meaningful change in a particular area which could create demand and momentum for later reforms. Thirdly, there is the argument that attempting too much reform simultaneously can divert attention from the core functions of the public service or undermine service delivery. These cogent points have been taken into account during the development of the Gambia CSRP 2018-2027 Strategy.

In a long term and comprehensive perspective, phasing is a strategic imperative for two reasons. Firstly, it is necessary to identify milestones of achievement (key outputs, outcomes and impact) to be monitored and evaluated within reasonable (say, medium term) time periods. Then there is a basis for effective periodic review and modifications in implementation strategies and plans. Secondly, phasing facilitates prioritization and sequencing. Prioritization is informed by a due consideration of the following: (i) what priority results (outputs and outcomes) the Government and other key stakeholders want to realize; (ii) what resources and implementation capacities are available to deliver on the priorities; and (iii) what results will generate interest and enhance support for change among the key stakeholders, and thereby render momentum for reform. Sequencing is based on continuous review of the implementation critical path, including scanning the wider Government for progress or otherwise in complementary reforms and developments.

1.5.5 Rapid building of implementation capacity

CSRP 2012-2015 design identified the capacity building requirements for its effective implementation. That capacity building did not take place and this partly explains the limited scope and effectiveness of the program implementation. This mistake has to be avoided for CSRP 2018-2027. Capacity building is required at three levels:

- (a) In PMO, which has a broad statutory mandate (Public Service Act 1991) to organize Government and direct human resources management. The Cabinet has clearly given it the responsibility to lead, coordinate and support the reform programme as a whole. While the CSR unit in PMO has the functions of administrative coordination, M&E, and possibly managing resources of CSRP, it is important to recognize that the Divisions in PMO must have the direct responsibilities of championing, coordinating and accounting for reforms in their respective areas of mandate, and should be strengthened with that end in mind. However, PMO may not have the requisite capacity to effectively discharge its statutory functions and to effectively lead the implementation of the CSRP 2018-2027. Furthermore, it is not readily evident that the senior executives have all required knowledge and competencies to successfully lead and coordinate reform activities. So, it can be anticipated that the PMO staff need some training and possibly some technical assistance;
- (b) Selected MDAs at the “Centre of Government”, including the PSC, MOFEA’s Departments of Budget and Planning, which may be required to take lead in the implementation of particular components for which they have technical expertise; and
- (c) In all MDAs which will be the targets of a wide range of different reform activities. To this end, PMO should be in position to undertake capacity assessments at the stages of both strategy development and implementation of activities by individual MDAs.

However, this capacity building must not be mistaken for sending implementing officers for long term training. Emphasis should be on both short term interventions to impart relevant knowledge and formal skills, and informal education and training through active participation in the reform implementation processes. Further, the use of limited external technical assistance, which is expensive and not sustainable, will also be considered.


1.5.6 Reform must clearly impact on national development and public service delivery

To be and remain relevant the CSR Strategy must have its accent on improving public service delivery and contributing to poverty reduction. In this regard, firstly, the CSR Strategy must:

- (i) focus more strongly on service delivery, and to integrate its activities more effectively into the NDP and sector development programmes;
- (ii) directly and adequately respond to the underlying cross cutting or root problems, and the necessary pre-conditions that must be in place to change the behaviour of public servants and their institutions; and
- (iii) provide stronger incentives to change, in order to ensure reform reaches into substantive levels of service delivery.

The nexus of CSR Strategy sector development programmes (SDPs) and service delivery, (and thereby development and poverty reduction) will be appreciated in a total systems perspective, as illustrated in **Figure 1.1** below.

Figure 1.1: A Total Systems Perspective of CSRP and Sector Development Programmes Nexus



Source: Mutahaba, G. & Kiragu, K (2002): *Lessons of Public Service Reform from Five African Countries*, in D. Olowu (Eds), *Africa Development AfriqueEt Development*, Vol.XXVII, Nos.3&4

1.5.7 Proactive coordination, monitoring and evaluation of implementation

The failure to operationalize the CSRP implementation management structure (Figure 1.1 above) was detrimental to the implementation of CSRP 2012-2015. CSR necessarily involves an array of actors who must be coordinated for various reasons, including ensuring that resources and capacities are allocated in line with strategic priorities, and that inertia in implementation is detected and arrested in good time. Continuous monitoring and evaluation is necessary for effective coordination; holding all responsible to be accountable; recognizing and rewarding satisfactory performers, and sanctioning underperformers; and regularly informing leaders and other stakeholders of, either, the progress achieved or the explanations for underachievement.

The CSRP Implementation Management structure designed for CSRP 2012-2015 should serve the CSRP 2018-2027 well, if it can be operationalized. The primary role and mandate to coordinate has been assigned to the PMO. CSR Unit has the primary responsibility for the monitoring and evaluation, but all implementing agencies must cooperate with the unit in the discharge of this function. A challenge for PMO, and therefore the CSR unit, will be to differentiate between coordinating and controlling implementation. This is elaborated in the implementation strategy.

2 Situation Analysis

2.1 Major issues and challenges of the civil service today

2.1.1 Introduction

On the basis of the facts and views offered by key informants interviewed (see **Appendix 2**) and the representatives who responded to a questionnaire, the major issues and challenges facing the civil service today are elaborated below under the following headings:

- (i) Proliferation of public sector entities with overlap of roles and functions;
- (ii) Collapse of legacy standard personnel administration systems and practices;
- (iii) Gaps in discipline and ethical conduct by civil servants;
- (iv) Low and poorly administered remuneration and incentives for the civil servants;
- (v) Growth in numbers and the wage bill have outpaced fiscal capacity; and
- (vi) Ad hoc and inadequate capacity building.


2.1.2 Proliferation of public sector entities with overlap of roles and functions

Geographically, demographically and economically, The Gambia is comparatively a small country. Therefore, the organization of the Government, and the public sector as a whole, should reflect an optimization based primarily on considerations of efficiency and effectiveness of public service delivery, and affordability and fiscal capacity on the other. However, achieving optimal size and cost of the public sector is a legacy major challenge for the past governments of The Gambia, since the 1970s. Thus, for example, a 1991 World Bank publication (de Merode, 1991) observed that while the Gambian economy remained roughly stagnant in the 1970s after a period of slow growth in the 1960s, the public sector was undergoing a period of extremely rapid expansion. The result of this growing imbalance between the size of the public sector and the productive base was severe crowding out of budgetary outlays for O&M which declined by 50 percent in real terms between 1980 and 1985, and a similar drop of 50 percent in real average civil service compensation between 1980 and 1986." Consequently, there was a programme to down size the public sector and retrench employees in the second half of the 1980s. The root cause of this problem is the tendency to structure and operate the GOTG in the model of countries with much larger economic bases, populations and geographical spread. Six years ago, the GOTG consisted of about 21 ministries, including the Office of the President. Today, GOTG is constituted of 23 ministries. On top of that, there are more than 60 public sector entities (institutions) to which the Government needs to make regular budgetary subventions (see **Appendix 4**).

Proliferation of public sector organizations (ministries, state enterprises, state agencies, diplomatic missions, local governments, etc.) has over the years since independence driven by pursuit of more effective governance and development management. However, in the creation of new ministries, state enterprises and agencies, the roles of policy making and regulation, which ideally belong to the core of the Government (ministries) have slipped to state enterprises and agencies, while ministries continue to undertake implementation functions that more appropriately should be, either, devolved to agencies and local governments, or contracted out or privatized. For example, in the functions of trade policy

making, promotion and regulation, there is a ministry, a competitiveness commission and an export promotion agency. Some of these functions are also duplicated or can be synergized with those of tourism promotion and regulation, where again there is a ministry and autonomous agencies. Also, decentralization has not significantly impacted on the range and scope of functions, service delivery and staffing in the ministries. Therefore, the structures of Government are overextended, expensive and inefficient. Budgetary subventions to the extra-ministerial agencies have doubled in the past four years (see **Figure 2.1**), and thereby added to the fiscal strains facing the GOTG. There is scope for the Government of to rationalize and streamline the functions, organization and staffing of the public sector in pursuit of efficiency and effectiveness.

Figure 2.1: Budgetary Subventions to Agencies, 2012-2017



2.1.3 Collapse of legacy standard personnel administration systems and practices

Key informants to the CSR strategy development process have decried the collapse of legacy standard personnel administrative systems and practices. In this regard, it is perceived and observed by a large proportion of civil servants that:

- (i) Government leaders and top administrators are not allowing due process as stipulated in law and standing orders in the transfers, demotions and even dismissals of senior civil servants;
- (ii) Generally, there is limited adherence to meritocratic principles in recruitment and promotions;
- (iii) The practice of regular staff appraisals as the basis for staff promotions has fallen to disuse;
- (iv) Schemes of service are not systematically administered;
- (v) The “maslaha” syndrome, which epitomizes nepotism and patronage relationships, has replaced the ethic of professionalism among majority of civil servants; and

- (vi) Senior civil servants are not taking due care of Government assets and facilities placed under their stewardship.

2.1.4 Gaps in discipline and ethical conduct by civil servants

There is evidence of some gaps in discipline and ethical conduct among some civil servants, including bribery and corruption in the civil service. One readily observed feature of indiscipline is failure by a significant proportion of civil servants to observe work time and to use their time productively on the job. It is also observed in misuse of Government assets and facilities. Soliciting of bribes has also been observed among civil servants in the frontline of service delivery to citizens, and those with responsibilities for collecting revenue (police, health workers, revenue officers, etc.). Corruption is reportedly suspected in some public procurement transactions. The breakdown in the personnel administration standards and practices, as elaborated above has contributed to the indiscipline and unethical conduct by undermining morale and thereby observance of morals and ethos among civil servants. Low remuneration, as elaborated below, is another of the main factors that have enabled the rise of indiscipline and unethical conduct among some civil servants.

Such elements of indiscipline and unethical conduct undermine performance of the civil service. Moreover, unless such tendencies are arrested in good time, they will over time pervasively spread, and progressively undermine morale and performance.

2.1.5 Low and poorly administered remuneration and incentives for the civil servants

In the words of virtually every civil servant encountered, the most serious problem, issue and challenge facing the civil service today is low remuneration and poor incentives. The deterioration in civil service pay is a legacy of economic decline in the 1970s and early 1980s and the consequential economic austerity of the structural adjustment programmes that followed in the 1980s and 1990s. To reverse or mitigate the trend, in 1991, GOTG promulgated a Civil Service Pay Policy that committed the Government to "...a Civil Service pay regime which should be sufficient to recruit, retain and motivate good quality staff who will efficiently and effectively manage the human and material resources of the country...".

Macroeconomic and fiscal constraints, exacerbated by rapid growth in employment and the wage bill, and poor administration of the remuneration and systems have over the years undermined implementation of that 1991 policy. In both one-to-one interviews and the survey undertaken to inform this strategy, low pay (including salary, incentives, pensions, etc.) was cited as the number one issue and challenge for the civil service today. A close scrutiny of the problem confirmed that it manifests itself in the following respects:

- (a) **Low salaries and benefits for civil servants:** Since 2010, civil servants have had no general salary adjustment. Any increase have been awarded to civil servants through promotions or allowances. Yet, such promotions and allowances have not been based on transparent criteria of merit and fairness. In any case, for the vast majority of the civil servants the purchasing power of

their regular earnings of salaries and allowances has been progressively eroded by inflation since 2010;

(b) **A defective pay and job grading structure:** The study of Civil Service Pay and Grading Structure concluded in 2014, and which still awaits Cabinet approval, highlighted the following anomalies in the pay and job grading structure:

- (i) the annual salary increments built into the job grades in the pay scale and by schemes of service are both low and in fixed money terms. Therefore, just as with salaries, the real value of the annual adjustments has been steadily eroded by inflation;
- (ii) the award and administration of allowances and other remunerative incentives, which are increasingly a major portion of a civil servants employment benefits has neither been demonstrably fair, nor equitable, nor transparent. Today, the total number of remunerative allowances paid to civil servants is about 30. Only two of these allowances, i.e. transport allowance and special allowance, are accessed by every civil servant. Most of the allowances are biased in favour of some employees, sectors and cadres. The allowances also do not count in determination of pension benefits. They serve to distort both the civil service pay and pensions systems;
- (iii) there has not been any systematic exercise of job evaluation and grading for many years when new jobs have been introduced or re-graded. Changes in grading brought about by adjustments to schemes of service or introduction of new schemes to ensure reasonable relativities in job and salary grading. According to key informants surveyed, there are now many jobs in the civil service that are over-graded. Therefore, consistency and fairness, between job grading and compensation is no longer evident. In other words, many civil servants cannot observe compliance by the Government with the principle of “equal pay for work of equal value”; and
- (iv) the current civil service salary and grade structure is not in accord with a robust system for staff motivation, compensation for competencies and responsibilities and career progression in the evolving competitive market for experienced technical and professional skills. The number of grade levels (currently at 13) is considered comparatively high and only consistent with the legacy perspective that the civil service is a lifetime career, but social dynamics are changing that. Also, the structure has narrow spans of command so that in many instances there is an inadequate gap in job grades when differences in responsibility are considered.

(c) **The value of civil servants’ pension benefits has diminished to very low:** A combination of low and steadily declining salaries (on which pension benefits are based) and inflation has eroded purchasing power of civil servants’ pension benefits to the level where, according to interviewed civil servants, “the monthly payment is not adequate to pay for a bag of rice” and many of the beneficiaries would spend more on bus fare in travelling to the offices or banks where they can access the pension payments. Hence, civil servants in service today observe that majority of retired civil servants are living in poverty today. The current civil servants are worried about their own post-employment prospects, and this further undermines their morale and sense of commitment to the civil service.

In any system or organization, persistently low employee remuneration and benefits, eventually leads to low staff morale, indiscipline and poor job performance. Country surveys, as synthesized in Kiragu and Mukandala (2005) publication, shows that the results can be absenteeism, alternative employment, rent-seeking (e.g. the “per diem” problem, sitting allowance) and low productivity or seeking change of

job. Past surveys of public service performance and productivity carried out in Africa and elsewhere by such organizations as the World Bank, show that “as government compensation falls, both in absolute terms and relative to alternative remunerative activities, public servants adjust to the new situation. Turnover rates and absenteeism increases; moonlighting and day-lighting become more frequent, and the latter, more blatant; and recruitment and retention, especially of professionals, become more difficult (see for example, Lindauer & Nunberg, October 1994). It has also been argued, in Rickeghem & Weder (June 1997) that petty corruption rises, including the sale of government services themselves: for example, under-the-table charges for livestock vaccinations or the extorting of payments by teachers to instruct schoolchildren. This observation goes with a common adage that: if a Government pretends to pay the workers, then the workers will pretend to work. A Report on the dialogue on the New Pathways for Civil Service Reform in The Gambia that was prepared for PMO in 2014 identified low salaries as the main factor underlying a high level of job dissatisfaction expressed by civil servants.

At the Cabinet Retreat of June 2014, The President directed that civil servants pay should be raised, and that the minimum salary for civil servants should be D2500 per month. Thereafter, a task Force commissioned by The Vice President worked on a strategy to mobilize resources to enable significant adjustments in pay as directed by the President. However, the recommendations of the Task Force are yet to be implemented and there is currently no fiscal space to allow any major salary adjustments for civil servants.

2.1.6 Growth in numbers and the wage bill have outpaced fiscal capacity

In the days of structural adjustment programmes, the civil service wage bill was brought under control. According to a consultant’s review of civil service reform status in the period preceding the launch of CSRP 2012-2015 (Brown K., 2008), at the time, the size of the civil service was smaller than the average for low income African countries, and the wage bill, which averaged 27% of recurrent expenditures and 4.4% of GDP, was “relatively low by sub-Saharan African standards, where wage bill to GDP ratios typically range from 5 - 9%”.

In spite of a poor and disabling macroeconomic and fiscal environment in the period of the CSRP 2012-2015, there has been comparatively rapid growth in the numbers in the civil service payroll in the period. On average, in the period 2013 to May 2017, the regular numbers in the civil service payroll has risen by about 69%, or about 14% per annum (see **Table 2.1**). This rapid growth in employment has of course translated to growth in the size of the wage bill, and in turn to a tighter fiscal situation.

Table 2.1: Annual % Growth in Civil Service Employees, 2013-2017 (as at May 2017)

Grade	Dec-13	Dec-14	Dec-15	Dec-16	May -17	Total	Average
One	16.5%	22.0%	11.05%	12.63%	14.84%	77.02%	15.40%
Two	-5.1%	11.6%	11.13%	12.31%	13.53%	43.47%	8.69%
Three	-1.6%	22.8%	15.62%	14.72%	14.19%	65.73%	13.15%
Four	-2.8%	6.5%	9.34%	8.92%	8.57%	30.53%	6.11%
Five	-7.0%	6.1%	5.83%	5.33%	5.06%	15.32%	3.06%
Six	-1.2%	25.5%	20.99%	19.47%	18.51%	83.27%	16.65%

Grade	Dec-13	Dec-14	Dec-15	Dec-16	May -17	Total	Average
Seven	1.2%	21.2%	14.26%	15.68%	14.96%	67.30%	13.46%
Eight	21.6%	7.6%	5.63%	5.45%	5.12%	45.40%	9.08%
Nine	10.5%	4.3%	2.82%	2.55%	2.40%	22.57%	4.51%
Ten	10.4%	1.6%	1.77%	1.60%	1.52%	16.89%	3.38%
Eleven	-12.8%	11.0%	0.80%	0.71%	0.69%	0.40%	0.08%
Twelve	-4.7%	9.9%	0.54%	0.44%	0.41%	6.59%	1.32%
Aggregate	5.0%	19.2%	6.8%	17.5%	9.0%	57%	11.5%

The issue of too rapid a growth in the size of the civil service to enable a matching with a budget allocation that is consistent with satisfactory remuneration and incentives has already been highlighted. One problem that apparently underlies this challenge is the absence of strategic human resource planning. Today, as has been the case for two or three decades, there has been no serious human resource planning in that the numbers of staff are determined in sector silos on the basis of preferences of politicians, influential sector stakeholders (politicians, development partners and top civil servants) and the exigencies to make decisions in the annual budget formalities of determining the establishment and the matching allocation for personnel emoluments. In the circumstances, determination of categories and numbers of employees to recruit is characteristically ad hoc, incremental and devoid of a strategic perspective. In any case, it is apparent that the data and information needed to make strategic human resources planning are not readily available. Over the past five years, most rapid in numbers has been at job grades where unskilled or semi-skilled workers enter the public service; as in the annual averages of 24.7% and 18.3% in job grades 1 and 3, respectively (**Table 2.1**). Data available also suggests that rapid growth has not necessarily been in the MDAs that provide basic social services (such as education and health) but also in wider public service, including the National Assembly and the Judiciary (see **Table 2.2**)

Table 2.2: Increase in Public Service numbers 2013-2017 by MDAs¹(as at May 2017).

MDA	Dec-13	Dec-14	Dec-15	Dec 2016	May 2017	% change
<i>01-Office of the President</i>	876	1064	1155	1199	1222	39%
<i>02-National Assembly</i>	122	125	181	199	198	62%
<i>03-Judiciary</i>	349	394	432	507	500	43%
<i>05-Public Service Commission</i>	19	20	22	17	17	-11%
<i>06-National Audit Office</i>	51	53	57	68	68	33%
<i>07-Ministry of Defence</i>	5898	6193	6686	6988	7074	20%
<i>08-Ministry of Interior</i>	8014	8920	9501	9865	10505	31%
<i>09-Ministry of Tourism & Culture</i>	25	29	29	29	31	24%
<i>10-Ministry of Foreign Affairs</i>	122	134	133	133	139	14%
<i>11-Ministry of Justice</i>	89	104	121	124	141	58%

¹ The numbers of the wider public service by far exceed those of what is taken as the civil service (as in Table 2.1 above)

MDA	Dec-13	Dec-14	Dec-15	Dec 2016	May 2017	% change
12-Min of Finance & Economic Affairs	254	278	321	334	334	31%
16-Ministry of Local Govt. & Lands	328	342	344	356	354	8%
17-Ministry of Agriculture	773	910	1010	1068	1101	42%
18-Min of Works Cons. & Infrastructure	124	153	155	151	143	15%
19-Min of Trade Indus. & Employment	94	101	104	105	112	19%
20-Ministry of Education	9868	11770	13109	14734	15704	59%
21-Min of Health & Social Welfare	2280	2692	2936	3300	3348	47%
22-Ministry of Youth & Sports	40	52	56	59	56	40%
23-Ministry of Environment	478	561	589	608	602	26%
24-Ministry of Comm Info & Technology	63	67	73	71	73	16%
25-Min of Fisheries	82	86	97	110	113	38%
27-Min of Tertiary & Higher Education	46	52	58	58	62	35%
28 - Ministry of Energy	31	35	36	34	35	13%
29-Ministry of Petroleum	18	20	26	25	26	44%
Total	30,044	34,155	37,231	40,142	41,958	40%

2.1.7 Ad hoc and inadequate capacity building

PAGE Evaluation: “The specific challenges in the public service addressed by the PAGE include: limited analytical capacity for policy analysis, policy-making and planning occasioned by high attrition; poor management of human resources, low remuneration and few incentives; quality of the delivery of civil services; and the efficiency of the delivery of the services.

PAGE: “Another factor worthy of mention is the limited human resource capacity in Government to implement the reforms. The Civil service reform project was launched at the end of 2008 and will take time to improve the acknowledged public service management deficiencies and delivery particularly at the level of the poor”. However, pursuit of a long term strategy and programme to address civil service issues appears to have eluded the Government’s CSR initiatives so far.

2.2 Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis

The strategy development team (**Appendix 1**) undertook a situational analysis of the civil service. Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) analysis was at the core of this analysis. Matrix **Table 2.3** below presents a summary of the results of the SWOT analysis.

Table 2.3: A Summary of SWOT Analysis by the Strategy Development Team (SDT) members

Strengths and Opportunities	Weaknesses and Threats
<p><u>Strengths</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Basically sound institutional framework for civil service administration is in place ✓ Youthful service ✓ Government commitment to training/capacity ✓ MDAs have strategic plans ✓ Commitment of Government leadership/political will ✓ National development visions and plans ✓ Better educated pool of employees ✓ Can attract some employees from other sectors ✓ There are still civil servants who are committed to service ✓ Personnel with qualifications ✓ Policy and regulatory in place ✓ Government has embraced technology ✓ Decentralisation is in place – good for service delivery ✓ ICT usage is growing fast 	<p><u>Weaknesses</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Major gaps in skills and other competencies ✓ Indiscipline – all round ✓ Bureaucracy ✓ Bloated size and expanding wage bill ✓ A degree of nepotism and tribalism ✓ Inadequate resources and facilities to enable performance ✓ Gaps in some important competencies ✓ Job insecurity among some senior executives ✓ Lack of commitment among executives ✓ “maslaha” syndrome ✓ Weak PFM ✓ Weak recruitment and promotion system – various reasons
<p><u>Opportunities</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ National development visions and plans for national transformation ✓ ICT infrastructure is improving ✓ Policies and rules in place for public service management ✓ Availability of CB facilities – universities and other higher learning institutions, etc. ✓ Educated youthful population ✓ Political stability ✓ Political will ✓ Analytical work done in pay and pensions issues ✓ Complementary reforms (PFM reform, decentralization, state enterprises reform, etc.) are underway 	<p><u>Threats</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Low level of country resources limits Government’s capacity for speedy structural reforms, ✓ High turnover of leaders and senior executives in positions critical to all round civil service effectiveness. ✓ Globalization expose the civil servants to some undesirable cultural influences ✓ Underdevelopment of local institutions for training in professional skills ✓ Small and underdeveloped private sector ✓ Poaching of competencies by other sectors ✓ Increased sense of insecurity among senior executives ✓ Lack of development partners’ support to CSR ✓ Slow economic growth and fiscal constraints

2.3 Status quo risks analysis and mitigation measures

Against the backdrop of the results of the SWOT analysis, the lessons learnt and the strategic imperatives derived from the evaluation of legacy CSR programs, a status quo risks analysis and identification of mitigation measures has been undertaken to inform the strategy for CSRP 2018-2027. The results of this analysis are presented in **Table 2.4**. The mitigation measures together with the results of situation analysis presented above inform the strategic thrust, the strategic objectives and strategies for the CSRP 2018-2027.

Table 2.4: CSRP 2018-2027 Strategy Status Quo Risks and Mitigation Measures

Risk	Probability Impact	Risk minimization measures
Stakeholder risks		
Lack of ownership and commitment to a far-reaching structural civil service reform agenda by the National Leadership	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Top administrators at the “Centre of Government” participate in collaboratively forging and owning the reform agenda, and communicating the same to the national political leadership • Cabinet endorsement of the CSR agenda from the outset • Regular updates to Cabinet on progress of implementation
Weak participation by MDAs in the implementation of the CSR	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clarify responsibilities of MDAs to respective Ministers and Permanent Secretaries (PSs) • Achieve effective coordination and oversight by a high level inter-agency board (established under CSRP 2012-2015) • Proper awareness creation of the CSRP • Constantly monitor level of implementation activities and make recommendations for improvements where necessary
Civil servants continue to be demoralized by low compensation and unwilling to change their attitudes and conduct	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prioritize implementation of low-cost personnel administration practices that improve motivation (e.g. training, career development, pay) • Promulgate and adhere to a clear path for enhancement and other reforms of remuneration and benefits for civil servants in medium to long term framework, as well as communicate such developments to them for morale booster • Constant reminders to civil servants about

Risk	Probability Impact	Risk minimization measures
		misconducts and sanctions attached to such misbehaviours
Environment risks		
Macroeconomic challenges precipitate a crisis-management mood across Government, and hence inertia in the implementation of reforms	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Clearly juxtapose CSR into the broader public sector reforms and the PAGE strategies
The political leadership is not prepared to wait for results which will only be achieved in the medium and long-term	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Build “early wins” into the implementation plan and communicate effectively the results Generally educate, inform and communicate on the strategy and explain why major results of sustainable reforms take time
Programme risks		
Piecemeal and fragmented implementation of the strategy, i.e. no strategic prioritization and sequencing	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implement a robust (but simple to operationalize) M&E system for the programme Achieve proactive oversight and coordination by an authoritative Board
Top and senior executives in MDAs are not motivated to implement the reforms	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Outputs and activities in support of reforms to be clear in strategic and annual work plans, and budgets of MDAs A rewards and sanctions framework to be operationalized with a focus on achieving of strategic/reform results by top and senior executives
Lead agency risks		
PMO and central implementing agencies (OSG, MOFEA, PSC) do not rapidly build all round capacity to lead and coordinate	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PMO presents a business case to MOFEA for allocation of funds for priority capacity building as in the CSR strategy MOFEA to proactively coordinate development partners to support CSR
PMO tries to control implementation, and in so doing fails to build support and ownership within MDAs	Moderate	Induct PMO on the difference between coordinating and controlling, and the benefits of a coordinating approach

3 Vision and Medium Term Strategic Focus, Thrust, and Objectives

3.1 Vision

The mission of The Gambia Civil Service is set in the Constitution and elaborated in the Public Service Act, 1991. The mission is expounded in the statement below.

Mission of the Gambia Civil Service

To deliver quality services for socio-economic development of The Gambia with professionalism, efficiency and effectiveness

However, it is pertinent that a vision is determined and promulgated to guide the development of the strategy. The vision is forged against the backdrop of the national development visions, the mission of the civil service, and the issues and challenges the civil service is confronting today. The vision horizon extends to end of the CSRP 2018-2027 and is stated in the box below.

A Vision for the CSRP 2018-2027

A civil service that performs to world class standards in delivering quality services to all the citizens of The Gambia

3.2 Strategic focus: Enhanced fiscal stability and improved service delivery


Since CSRP 2018-2027 is aligned to the NDP, it must demonstrably contribute to the priority goals of the NDP in both medium and long term perspectives. The situation analysis has confirmed the nexus of rapid civil service expansion, wage bill burden and fiscal imbalances. Therefore, in a medium term perspective, as underscored in the NDP and latest economic policy targets as pronounced by the MOFEA, CSRP must contribute to enhanced fiscal stability.

On the other hand, civil service expansion, as well as its improved ability to attract, retain and motivate skilled technical and professional personnel, are necessary for enhancing citizens' access to quality basic services. In other words, in the medium term, growth of the wage bill may not be fully held down without adverse impact on service delivery. Yet, improved service delivery is a medium to long term strategic imperative from macro-economic, social and political angles. Therefore, in implementing CSRP interventions that contribute to improved fiscal stability, it will be necessary to keep focus on implications for public service delivery.

It is conventional wisdom in strategic management that first, functions, structures and systems of the implementing organizations should follow strategy. On the latter basis, then the organization (MDA) can be expected to be efficient and effective in the discharge of its mandate and performance of its roles and functions (service delivery). Second, strategic leadership and management are critical to ensuring that the organization (MDA) consistently and sustainably delivers quality services to its clients (the citizens). These perspectives inform the determination of the priority strategic objectives that the CSRP will pursue. In this regard, the strategic focus of the CSRP 2018-2027, is forged within the integrated framework illustrated in **Figure 3.1** below:

- Effective leadership and management of the ministries, departments and agencies;
- Sector strategies that drive MDAs strategic plans, structures, systems and service delivery models;
- Ownership, responsibility and accountability for results by each MDA; and
- PMO's effective discharge of its coordination, oversight and M&E roles.

Figure 3.1: Illustration of an Integrated Framework that Guides Strategic Focus



Source: ©Kithinji Kiragu (www.adpgroup.org)

3.3 Strategic thrust: Pacing, Prioritizing and Sequencing, and Phasing

The strategic thrust of the CSRP 2018-2027 is characterized by three features, which are described below under the following headings:

- Pacing
- Prioritizing and sequencing
- Phasing

3.3.1 Pacing

A comprehensive CSR is a comparatively technically complex and socio-politically sensitive undertaking. Therefore, the strategy, implementation modalities and their timing, and priorities must be paced to suit the prevailing socio-political environment. In this regard, it is crucial that there is consensus among top political leaders and top executives of the relevance and feasibility of every strategic initiative, and the timing of its implementation. Until such a consensus is reached, implementation will be held in abeyance.

3.3.2 Prioritizing and sequencing

Prioritizing and sequencing strategic initiatives and major implementation activities is important from both strategic and practical considerations. Strategically, as lessons of experience with public sector reforms show, it is important that priorities is given to initiatives that: (i) constitute the basics upon which sustainable change will be realized; and (ii) provide the most socio-economic impact in a medium to long term perspective. On the other hand, the priorities and sequencing will be driven by the practical realities of what is technically feasible and affordable at each phase of the reform programme.

3.3.3 Phasing

The long term perspective of the CSRP 2018-2027 is schematically illustrated in **Figure 3.2** below. Figuratively, the programme will have two phases, as follows:

- (i) **Phase 1 – Institutional Rationalization and Consolidation:** This phase will begin in 2018 and end in 2022. In this phase, the reform programme will address all the institutional and structural issues and challenges described in section 2.1 of this strategy. Strategic focus will be on building and strengthening “fit-for-purpose” civil service institutions, systems, structures and personnel establishments. The strategic objectives, initiatives and target results are elaborated in this strategy document;
- (ii) **Phase 2 – Re-engineering and Transformation:** This phase will generally entail critical business process reviews and re-engineering, and innovations and state of the art initiatives that exploit best global practices. Full exploitation of ICT will be central to the knowledge, methodologies and techniques that will be applied in a drive to e-government and modernization of service delivery processes. In the implementation processes, the skills and other competencies of civil servants will be revamped, and the capacities and performance of the MDAs will attain World class standards, as consistent with overall transformation of The Gambia as developed state.

3.4 Strategic objectives

The strategic objectives in each of the two phases of CSRP 2018-2027 are presented in brief in **Figure 3.2**. In a more elaborate manner, the strategic objectives for Phase 1 are the following:


- (i) To achieve optimal organization and staffing of the public service ;
- (ii) To attract, retain and motivate optimal numbers of technical and professional personnel into the civil service;
- (iii) To enhance discipline, ethical conduct and high performance of civil servants;

- (iv) To re-institutionalize meritocracy, due process and professionalism in personnel administration;
- (v) To accelerate improvements in public service delivery through ICT applications; and
- (vi) To systematically identify and sustainably close capacity gaps in the civil service.

Against each of the above six strategic objectives, specific strategies, strategic initiatives and key target outputs are presented in the next chapter of this strategy document. Further, in the subsequent two chapters (six and seven), the results monitoring and evaluation indicators against each of the strategic objectives, and the costs estimates and budget are presented.

The strategic objectives of Phase 2 of the CSRP 2018-2027 are tentatively determined because they will be elaborated in the context of the results realized in Phase 1, based on key outputs from the results programme implementation environment anticipated.

Figure 3.2: Summary illustration of the Phased Approach to CSRP Strategy



4 Strategies, Strategic Initiatives and Key Target Results

4.1 Introduction

The strategies, strategic initiatives and key target results are derived against each of the strategic objectives in Phase 1 of the Strategy, which are:

- i. To achieve optimal organization and staffing of the public sector;
- ii. To attract, retain and motivate optimal numbers of technical and professional personnel into the civil service;
- iii. To enhance discipline, performance and accountability of civil servants;
- iv. To reinforce meritocracy, due process and professionalism in personnel administration;
- v. To accelerate improvements in public services delivery by harnessing information and communication technologies (ICT); and
- vi. To systematically close capacity gaps in the civil service.

4.2 Strategic Objective 1: To achieve optimal organization and staffing of the public sector

The pursuit of this strategic objective was already underway under the CSR 2012-2015. The aim is to ensure the affordability and cost-effectiveness of Government operations.

Optimal organization and staffing of the public sector will, in the first instance, align the overall structure of Government with the strategic thrust of the national development visions, and the NDP. Under this strategic objective, poor interface of the organs and structures and functions, across the public sector arising from proliferation of public sector MDAs will be eliminated.

The pursuit of optimal organization and staffing is a top priority because it will deliver an enabling institutional and fiscal environment for sustainable pursuit of other strategic objectives of the CSR 2018-2027, in that the outcomes will include:

- (i) elimination of duplications, overlaps and redundancies of roles, functions, operations and staffing across and within MDAs;
- (ii) adopting alternative cost-efficient and effective modalities for public service delivery; and
- (iii) use of staffing norms to achieve efficient and effective utilization of personnel.

Table 4.1: Strategic Objective 1: Strategies, Initiatives and Key Target Outputs

Strategic Objective 1: To achieve optimal organization and staffing of the public sector (including security organs)					
Strategies	Strategic Initiatives	Key Target Results			Lead Agency
		Outputs	Year	Outcomes	
4.2.1 To review the range and distribution of all non-security functions of Government and allocation among state organs to confirm relevance and identify areas of overlap/duplication, and opportunities and options for more efficient and effective performance, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • rationalization • decentralization • outsourcing • public-private partnerships (PPPs) • etc. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Commission an inter-agency Task Team of Senior Civil Servants with the support of technical experts (s) to undertake the comprehensive review of institutional and organizational set-up of the public sector in terms of: duplication of roles and functions among ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs); and opportunities to streamline, merge and consolidate MDAs. 2) Undertake in-depth institutional and organisational rationalization review of every MDA, covering: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (i) Superfluous/redundant functions (ii) Re-assessment of functions (iii) Options and opportunities for contracting out, outsourcing, decentralizing, (iv) Organisations/agency to be streamlined, and how (v) etc. 3) Develop staff rationalization plans consistent with the implementation of the results of institutional and organisational rationalization and restructuring 4) Carry out the cost-benefit analysis and fiscal impact of the staff rationalization plan 5) Implement the institutional, organizational and staff rationalization measures 	An inter-agency review team in place and commissioned	2018	A streamlined and compact public sector institutional and organizational architecture (with fewer MDAs)	OSG, PMO MOFEA
		Rationalized institutional and organizational architecture and number of MDAs	2018		
		Institutional and organisational rationalization and restructuring plans overall and for every MDA	2018	Improved coordination of the GOTG operations	
		Cost-benefit analysis and fiscal impact of the rationalization plan	2018		
		Staff rationalization plans overall and for every MDA	2018	Improved efficiency and effectiveness of public service institutions	
		Rationalized new structures and staffing levels in MDAs	2019		
4.2.2 Develop and implement medium term plans for aligning staffing levels with	(a) Determine optimal staffing levels in the context of sector development plans, results of institutional and organisational review; and aggregate fiscal projections	Recommended optimal staffing levels by sector/ MDA, and in aggregate	2019	Enhanced fiscal sustainability	PMO & MOFEA

Strategic Objective 1: <i>To achieve optimal organization and staffing of the public sector (including security organs)</i>					
Strategies	Strategic Initiatives	Key Target Results			Lead Agency
		Outputs	Year	Outcomes	
fiscal space (projected wage bill envelope) by key sectors	(b) Align sector plans and annual budgets for personnel emoluments with the projected optimal staffing levels (within budget cycle) (c) Develop and implement staff rationalization plans	Sector plans with realistic staffing proposals	2020		
		MDAs with right-sized staffing levels	2020		
4.2.3 Freeze in new establishments and recruitment of personnel pending the results of the recommendations of the institutional, organizational and staffing reviews (4.2.1 – 4.2.3)	(a) Impose a one-year freeze in employment, deployment and promotions in all but high priority jobs pending the results of the institutional, organizational and fiscal rationalization of staffing levels and plans (b) Annual systematic review and appropriate adjustment of the freeze (c) Undertake periodic staff audits to ensure compliance with the freeze	Cabinet instructions imposing the freeze	2018	Controlled growth in the numbers of the public service employees	PMO & MOFEA
		Recommendations and instructions issued pending annual reviews of the freeze	2018		
		Payroll audits carried out	2019-2022	Controlled growth in size of the wage bill	
4.2.4 Implement a Human Resources Management Information System (HRMIS) to: avail timely information on the status of staffing in the public service; enable efficient payroll administration; and enable timely and effective decisions on recruitment, deployment, etc.	(a) Roll out the Human Resources Module in the Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS) (b) Transfer the current payroll data base into the HRMIS (c) Interface the HRMIS with the Electronic Records Management System (ERMS) that is under implementation by the National Records Service	An operating HRMIS	2019	Timely and more effective decision-making in human resources management	PMO & MOFEA
		Payroll installed in the IFMIS	2019		
		System/process in place for transfer of relevant HRMIS data to the ERMS	2019		

4.3 Strategic Objective 2: To attract, retain and motivate optimal numbers of civil service employees

The most important, but not the only factor to attracting, retaining and motivating personnel in any organization is adequacy and fairness of remuneration with regard to both internal and external parities given the “value of the job”. It is presumed that in the prevailing high levels of unemployed educated youth, there would be no major challenge in attracting unskilled, semi-skilled and inexperienced personnel into the civil service. Therefore, the focus must be on technical and professional personnel, for whom the civil service faces competition from other sectors, and in some cases from regional and global organizations, even countries.

Key informants indicate that Government is keen to implement the civil service pay policy and the pension reform policies that were completed with the support of the World Bank IDF Grant. In mid-2014, the Cabinet had established an inter-ministerial Task Force to look into the implementation of those recommendations. The Task Force completed its work in 2014 with recommendations for implementation of the reforms, including raising staff salaries and pensions. However, those recommendations have not yet been implemented.

It appears that there were both budgetary and other politically tough policy decisions that would have to be made in order to implement the Task Force recommendations. According to the Task Force, a total of D713.4 million was required to fund the gross increment of wages and pension revisions. And for these funds to be available, the Task Force recommended some spending cuts and initiatives that would entail “some painful but necessary budgetary adjustment and sacrifices in the management of public finances”. With regard to the latter, among the measures that the Task Force recommended were the following:

- (i) Introduction of a “Related Income Tax” to generate additional tax revenue of about D145 million;
- (ii) Cutting travel related expenditure from goods and services in the budget to realize savings of about D200m;
- (iii) Reviewing the policy of Government on establishing missions abroad, rationalize the number of staff in diplomatic missions whose functions have declined, and eliminate spending overruns associated with movements of diplomatic staff by strictly sticking to the periodicity of diplomatic posting defined under existing policy;
- (iv) Downsizing non-priority programs, strictly adhere to a zero ceiling on unbudgeted spending, and implement concrete measures to minimize abuses and inefficiencies;
- (v) Maintaining optimal and efficient Public Service;
- (vi) Rationalizing the Gambia’s membership to international organizations with a target to save about D100m; and
- (vii) Reducing transfers to non-growth contributing public entities with a target saving of about D50 million.

The above recommendations by the Task Force on salaries and pensions adjustments underpin the point that with political will to take tough policy decisions, there are distinct prospects for mobilizing significant domestic resources that can support continuation of the CSR activities, and sustain its results in the medium to long term. The Task Force work also confirms that there are considerable

national capacities to design and implement CSR when key institutions in Government collaborate. Again, commitment and active participation of the top leadership of the Government, both political and executive, will be crucial for these possibilities to be realized and sustained.

It is also noteworthy that, in the opinion of the evaluator, there is the risk of not sustaining the CSR 2012-2015 main success story, i.e. the CSRLS. So far, the loan scheme has operated at a fairly low level. Only 603 civil servants, out of a total about 20, 911 have so far benefitted from the scheme, and total funding is D67.5 million. The programme is very popular, and as the demand picks up, there are distinct possibilities that constraints in funding and administration of the scheme will emerge. This could have very negative effects on civil servants morale. Therefore, it is important that the next phase of the CSR strategically explores ways of sustaining the CSRLS.

The ultimate output under this objective is an efficacious remuneration and benefits system. Ten generally accepted attributes of such a system are:

1. Satisfying to the employee: The employees take the remuneration and benefits to be commensurate with their roles, functions and responsibilities. According to this attribute, it is postulated that an employee's pay should at least cover the cost of living, measured as the median value of goods and services for a nuclear family;
2. Competitive in the labour market: The system enables the employer to attract and retain personnel with required competencies;
3. Cost of living adjustments: The employees are protected from loss of purchasing power arising from erosion in the real value of their remuneration and benefit packages;
4. Affordable by the employer: The employer can meet the payroll costs on a regular basis and the costs are commensurate with production rather than being disruptive;
5. Certainty to the employees: It is clear to the employees the remuneration and benefits they expect regularly from the employer at specified times;
6. Motivates productivity and performance by the employees: The remuneration and benefits system has rewards and sanctions for meeting or exceeding employer expectations of productivity and performance in a given time period;
7. Fairness and equity in the perception of the employees: The employees have information that makes them believe that the employer does not practice discrimination in remuneration and benefits awards;
8. Opportunities for professional development and career progression: The employees see opportunities for personal development, including enhanced competencies and promotions;
9. Adequacy of post-employment benefits: The employees have a degree of confidence that they can still afford a decent life following exit from employment; and
10. Aligned to the employers' (organisational) strategy: A remuneration and benefits sub-system is integral to an organisation's human capital management strategy. Since human capital is the most defining feature of an organisation's strategy, the remuneration and benefits policy must always be aligned to the organisation's strategy.

Against the backdrop of the above, the strategies, initiatives and key target outputs that will deliver the strategic objective 2 are presented in **Table 4.2**.

Table 4.2: Strategic Objective 2 Strategies, Initiatives and Key Target Outputs

Strategic Objective 2: To attract, retain and motivate optimal numbers of civil service employees					
Strategies	Strategic Initiatives	Key Target Results			Lead Agency
		Outputs	Year	Outcomes	
4.3.1 Develop and implement affordable and sustainable short to long term policy, strategies and modalities of enhancing civil service remuneration and incentives	(a) Assess feasibility and efficacy implementation of recommendations of the Task Force on increase of civil servants salaries and recommendations to Cabinet	Updated task force report presented to Cabinet	2018	Improved retention and motivation of technical and professional personnel in the civil service	PMO & MOFEA
	(b) Develop a Public Service Pay Policy, in the context of projected changes in fiscal space for the wage bill growth, and incorporating, as appropriate, the recommendations of the 2014 Study of civil service pay and grading structure policy	Updated civil service pay reform strategy and policy approved by the Cabinet	2018		
	(c) Benchmark and bi-annually undertake survey of comparative pay and incentives levels in non-state sectors as a basis of adjustments in pay for public servants.	Survey of comparative pay in public sector and other sectors	2018	Enhanced morale and satisfaction of public servants with employment compensation	
	(d) Analysis undertaken to review the efficacy and sustainability and sustainability of the administrative and funding arrangements for the Civil Servants Revolving Loan Scheme (CSRLS)	Study to ensure efficacy and sustainability of the Civil Servants Revolving Loan Scheme	2018		
		Study recommendations implemented	2019-2020		
		Annual adjustments in civil service pay and incentives levels	2019-2022		
4.3.2 Pursue harmony, equity and fairness in pay across jobs and grades in the civil service	(a) Complete the job evaluation and grading structure commenced under CSRP 2012-2015	Job specifications and descriptions completed for all civil servants	2019	Satisfaction of public servants that job grading and compensation is fair and equitable	PMO
	(b) Train GOTG officers, mainly in the PMO, in job evaluation and salary grading	New job grading structure approved by Cabinet	2019		
	(c) Undertake civil service job evaluations and				

Strategic Objective 2: To attract, retain and motivate optimal numbers of civil service employees					
Strategies	Strategic Initiatives	Key Target Results			Lead Agency
		Outputs	Year	Outcomes	
	salary re-grading every five years, and implement results				
		Job evaluation and re-grading plans implemented	2020-2022		
4.3.3 Introduce incentives to attract and retain adequate numbers of qualified personnel to serve in difficult and risky work environments	(a) Assess the efficacy of current schemes, where they exist, for encouraging public servants to serve in difficult and risky work environments, and make recommendations for improvements (b) Implement improved scheme(s)	Assessment of current scheme and recommendations	2019	Comparatively improved numbers and quality of personnel attracted and retained to work in difficulty and risky work environments Improved service delivery in those areas	PMO, MOFEA and sector MDAs
		Improved schemes for incentives to attract and retain personnel to serve in difficulty to work and risky environments	2020-2022		
4.3.4 Develop and implement policy, strategies and institutional framework that ensure adequacy, affordability and sustainability of the civil service pension scheme	(a) Develop a Public Service pension policy and reform programme and obtain Cabinet approval (based on updating the 2013 study) (b) Develop and submit to Parliament a new Public Service Pensions Bill (c) Enhance public servants retirement (pension) benefits on the basis of the recommendations of 2014 study under CSRP 2012-2015 (d) Implement medium to long plans for satisfactory and sustainably affordable retirement benefits scheme	Public Service Pension Policy and Reform Programme approved by Cabinet	2019	Satisfaction of public servants and retirees with Government concern for post-employment living standards of retirees.	MOFEA & PMO
		Public Service Pensions Bill submitted to Parliament	2020		
		Public Service Pensions Reform Programme implemented (possibly incorporating a Contributory Scheme)	2021		
		Periodic upward adjustments in public servants pensions benefits	2022 and beyond		

4.4 Strategic Objective 3: To enhance discipline, performance and accountability of civil servants

The raison d'être for employment and remuneration of civil servants is that they will deliver quality public services of a wide spectrum to the citizens and thereby support national development and transformation. The situational analysis above confirmed that the civil servants are in comparatively low morale, weak discipline and poor performance at work. A nexus of discipline, performance and demand for accountability is critical to the transformation of culture, conduct and performance of employees in any organization. In the absence of high discipline, besides skills and other competencies, the civil servants cannot give their best to public service. Without a strong demand side for accountability by either citizens or their representatives, employees are not likely to easily transform culture and behaviour, and perform, unless they are exceptionally inspired. Therefore, inculcating and nurturing a performance management culture in the civil service is a long-term undertaking.

However, the onset of pursuit of the performance management culture is a strategic priority. It is nonetheless critical that the initiatives adopted are well prioritized and sequenced. In a medium to long term perspective, it is necessary to institutionalize a Performance Management System (PMS). The purpose of a PMS at Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) is to improve performance by focusing on key areas of activity, which are identified through strategic planning processes. It seeks to establish clear links between organizational development, the delivery of quality services and the development of employees at work. It also aims to create a common bond of ownership among all employees as well as an environment where all individuals are developed, motivated and inspired to deliver a quality performance. The PMS serves the strategic purpose of integrating all levels of the organisation starting from the Head Organizational Unit (department) where planning is performed down to the individuals who conduct the day-to-day tasks. **Figure 4.1** outlines the PMS cycle as will apply in The Gambia. As can be seen from the figure, there are three main levels that make up the PMS, which are:

- (i) **PMS at MDA level:** The PMS helps the MDA to translate overall strategic priorities as laid down in the national development visions and NDP into sector/MDA strategic plans. In turn, the strategic plan enables the definition of objectives of the MDA; and the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for the department which show the achievement of the priorities identified in the strategic plan.
- (ii) **PMS at departmental/unit level:** PMS at departmental /unit level focuses on outputs and activities that lead to achievement of overall outcomes of the MDA. The Head of Department/Unit sets out the objectives at the departmental /unit which are derived from the departmental/unit plan.
- (iii) **PMS at individual level:** PMS at the individual level is an on-going interactive process between an employee and his/her supervisor. As shown at **Figure 4.2**, the performance appraisal process, covering a twelve month period consists of 3 phases:
 - Pre-appraisal: Planning and agreeing on performance targets
 - Mid-appraisal: Managing performance
 - Final-appraisal: Appraising/reviewing performance

Figure 4.1: PMS Cycle





Figure 4.2: Performance Appraisal Process



To ensure sustainability of the PMS, it is important that its installation is complemented by two other strategic measures, which are:

- (i) Strengthen the demand side for quality services and accountability by introducing “**Compacts with Citizens**” (CwCs)² to communicate what citizens can expect MDA to deliver to them and with what standards. As Downs, G. W. & Larkey, P.D (1986) observed in the United Kingdom, “productivity and performance measurement have a potentially important role to play in increasing government efficiency and effectiveness. Without them, we cannot fully understand how well agencies are serving us, we cannot begin to acquire a more sophisticated understanding of service technologies, and we cannot make intelligent decisions about the implementation of proposed innovations. Without good performance measurement, public-sector productivity will inevitably lag behind its potential”³. Thus, accountability and assessment of performance requires defined standards of delivery and ways to measure performance against the standards; and
- (ii) Design and implement a **Rewards and Sanctions Framework** so that there will be incentives for the MDA to perform, and for the individual civil servant to both observe discipline and perform. The incentives in this framework are not necessarily monetary.

Still, the institutionalization of a PMS will be a medium to long term undertaking, but improvements in discipline and public service delivery must be demonstrable in the short to medium term. Therefore, in tandem with design and implementation of the PMS, three strategies will be adopted to achieve significant achievements in improved discipline, performance and accountability by civil servants. These three strategies are expounded below under the following headings:

- (i) Instil a time management discipline;
- (ii) Install a performance contracting scheme; and
- (iii) Strengthen the demand side for quality services and accountability.

4.4.1 Instilling Time management discipline

Time management is the bedrock of every employee discipline. The employee should observe punctuality at the work place and strive to meet time deadlines in the performance of assigned tasks. It is also a budget-neutral change. It does not need to wait for the implementation of a PMS. Therefore, instilling a time management discipline is a priority initiative in the pursuit of improved discipline, in general, as well in employee performance. The strategies, initiatives and techniques that will be deployed to install time management discipline in the civil service are presented in **Table 4.3**.

² In the global literature on public service reforms, what has been coined as CwCs are usually referred to as citizens’ or clients’ charters

³ Downs, G. W. & Larkey, P.D (1986): The Search for Government Efficiency from Hubris to Helplessness, pg.91

4.4.2 Implementing a performance contracting scheme

Performance contracting serves to pioneer a results-based management by introducing a package of management instruments that can be readily implemented pending the institutionalization of a robust and comprehensive PMS. Among the instruments applied with performance contracting are:

- Annual performance targets for an MDA derived from a strategic plan and determined in a participatory process. The leadership and management of the MDA must own and commit to these targets, but they must at the same time show how these targets are aligned to the national development visions and the NDP;
- Independent inspection and assessment of performance measurement – based on a cost efficient and effective arrangement (possibly it will be outsourced to teams of experts from NGOs, such as GCCI, TANGO, University, etc.);
- Publicity of performance assessment results with a view to: (i) fostering internal competition between (and within) MDAs; and (ii) popular recognition and honour of achievers; and
- Rewards and sanctions framework that offers real, affordable and cost-effective incentives for high performers and sanctions for the poor performers.

Virtually every Anglophone country in Sub-Saharan Africa has attempted a Performance Contracting initiative but only three countries (Botswana, Kenya and Rwanda) have been assessed to have made some success of it. As a matter of fact, only Botswana and Rwanda appear to have sustained it. Independent sources suggest that, in spite of receiving a UNDP global award for it, Kenya's public service no longer exhibits good practice of performance contracting. Therefore, Performance Contracting will be an effective and sustainably useful instrument in the Gambia CSRP only if its design and implementation takes full cognizance of the challenges and imperatives for its success and the risks attendant to its successful implementation. In brief, the challenges encountered in Performance Contracting include:

- (i) Managing the culture shift and resistance to change
- (ii) Technical challenges, especially what targets and results to measure – relevance; inputs or outputs or outcomes (a balancing act)
- (iii) Sharing attribution for collaboratively achieved results, at both organizational (sector) and individual levels
- (iv) Finding an appropriate incentives and sanctions regime
- (v) External and internal politics of the results of assessments, at both organizational and individual levels. There is a distinct prospect that some constituencies will complain of bias, patronage and even bribery in the assessment of performance results⁴.

In the context of the above, the design and implementation of the performance contracting will entail managing the risks as illustrated in **Table4.3**.

⁴ See Africa Development Professional Group, Kenya & IPA, Canada (February 2009). Evaluation of Results for Kenya programme.

Table 4.3: Common risks entailed in operationalization of performance contracting

The Risks	Risk Rating	Mitigation measures
1. Measuring the wrong things outputs/outcomes or inputs	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Smart planning – aligned to the MDA strategic objectives • Smart annual plans at MDA and individual officer levels
2. Measuring wrongly (e.g. by applying uniform measures across MDAs)	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rigorous assessment what quantitative as well as qualitative measures are as important (and a manageable number of such measures)
3. No discernible change to a disengaging internal organization and management culture	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Give due emphasis to staff development • Good HRM practices – adherence to meritocratic principles, transparency and fairness • Open Performance Appraisal
4. Absence of effective incentives and sanctions ultimately undermines the initiative	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Start with a simple-to-administer rewards and sanctions framework (no overdue emphasis on monetary incentives/rewards) • Progressively develop and implement a performance management system
5. Politicisation of results of evaluation	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure stakeholders' participation, transparency, professionalism in the assessment of performance

4.4.3 Strengthening demand side for services and accountability

An important lesson from international experience is that empowering citizens to demand for services and accountability is a potent strategy to improving discipline and performance of public service employees. At a collective level, citizens can demand accountability through the activities of watchdog-oriented CSOs. Demand for accountability can further be strengthened through appropriately packaged education and information for individual citizens who would then be able to demand services and accountability at the service delivery “window”. To this end, the CSRP 2018-2027 will in the medium term introduce “compacts with citizens” (CwCs)⁵ by which the MDAs will declare to the citizens: what services they should expect; what will be the standards of those services; and what avenues are available for citizens to lodge complaints.

It is in the context of the above that the strategies to re-institutionalize high discipline, performance and accountability by The Gambia civil service have been identified, as presented in **Table 4.4** below.

⁵ In the global literature on public service reforms, what has been coined as CwCs are usually referred to as citizens' or clients' charters. Introduction of these charters had been planned under the CSRP 2012-2015.

Table 4.4: Strategic Objective 3 Strategies, Initiatives and Key Target Results

Strategic Objective 3: To enhance discipline, performance and accountability of civil servants						
Strategies	Strategic Initiatives	Key Target Results			Lead Agency	
		Outputs		Outcomes		
Design and implement a strategy to transform public servants behaviour with regard to time management	Design and develop a programme to change public servants behaviour with regard to time management, including: possible use of electronic clocking diaries, installation of CCTVs, calendars, time sheets or other record keeping.	Improved time management programme developed	2018	Improved civil servants punctuality and time utilized in service delivery Improved citizens' and leaders' satisfaction with civil servants conduct	PMO & MDAs	
	Time management performance results to be incorporated in the respective MDAs' performance contracts	Improved time management programme implemented	2018			
	MDAs to compile statistics of employee punctuality and clocking out time	Statistical reports on observance of official work times by civil servants	2018-2022			
Develop and implement a scheme of Performance Contracting for implementation by all MDAs	Develop the policy, procedures and formats for a performance contracting scheme to be endorsed by the Cabinet	Performance contracting scheme endorsed by the Cabinet	2018	Improved performance by MDAs and individual civil servants	PMO & MDAs	
	Educate and train MDAs in the use of the procedures and formats for application of the Performance Contracting	MDAs educated and trained in the procedures	2018			
	Implement the performance contracting	Performance contracts signed by Ministers and PSs	2018			
	Annual independent but participatory assessment of performance by the MDAs	Annual Assessments Against Performance Contract	2020			
	Convene a nationally well publicized and high profile Annual Performance Recognition and Awards Event (s)	Annual performance recognition and awards event(s)	2020-2022			
Develop and implement a Rewards and Sanctions Framework for individual performance (non-monetary)	Design a rewards and sanctions framework and obtain Cabinet approval (in tandem with the performance contracting scheme)	A rewards and sanctions framework approved by the Cabinet	2018	Improved discipline and performance by civil servants	PMO	
	Develop procedures manual for the operation of the rewards and sanctions framework (with emphasis on recognition and shaming, and not monetary rewards and sanctions)	Procedures manual of the framework	2018			
	Inform and educate civil servants on the modalities of the framework	MDAs educated and trained in the procedures	2019			

Strategic Objective 3: To enhance discipline, performance and accountability of civil servants					
Strategies	Strategic Initiatives	Key Target Results			Lead Agency
		Outputs		Outcomes	
	Roll out the rewards and sanctions framework as integral to Performance Contracting, in the first instances, and the PMS in the medium to long term	Civil servants annual Rewards and Sanctions	2020-2022		
Develop and implement a GOTG Performance Management System (PMS) around current planning, budgeting and staff appraisal systems	Design a GOTG PMS and plan implementation	GOTG PMS system and implementation programme in place	2020	Improved discipline and performance by civil servants	PMO, MOFEA
	Develop procedures manuals to support the PMS system	Procedures manuals to support PMS	2020		
	PMS implemented in MDAs	PMS effectively rolled out in MDAs	2021		
	Mount the PMS to the IFMIS/HRMIS electronic platform	Electronic PMS piloted	2022		
Strengthen demand side for services and accountability by civil service citizens	Design a "Compacts with Citizens" (CwCs) scheme and an implementation plan, including an IEC programme	Guidelines for CwCs developed	2019	Improved civil servants responsiveness to citizens' expectations	PMO, MDAs
	Develop manual of guidelines for use by MDAs in the development and administration of CwCs	Public servants trained on the guidelines	2020		
	Implement the IEC programme for the CwCs to communicate what citizens can expect MDA to deliver to them and with what standards	IEC programme rolled out for citizens	2020		
	MDAs roll out the CwCs	CwCs produced by MDAs	2020-2022		

4.5 Strategic Objective 4: To reinforce meritocracy, due processes and professionalism in personnel administration

Public servants will only observe high discipline and performance on a lasting basis (as a culture) if they perceive and experience adherence to meritocratic principles, fairness and professionalism in the decisions of personnel administration. As a matter of fact, there is no example of a well-performing civil service anywhere in the world in the last half-century or longer without the merit principle constituting the primary criterion for appointments and promotions. Of course in pursuit of merit principle, it is important to balance respect for the principle with attention to diversity, which entails ensuring fair representation for ethnic groups, geographical areas, women and persons with physical challenges. Therefore, to achieve the transformation of the civil service in the time-span of CSRP 2018-2027, it is important to re-institutionalize the policy and practices of meritocracy in appointments and promotions.

Institutionalization of the merit principle and practices is also critical to attaining and maintaining professionalism in the civil service. Then, personnel administration in the civil service should depict administrative standards, efficiency, transparency and accountability to the civil servants. To achieve these, personnel administration should be guided by clear policies, structures, systems, standards and procedures. Moreover, those entrusted with the functions should have the requisite competencies.

The strengthening of discipline and performance in the civil service (strategic objective 3) must go hand in hand with a personnel administration system that ensures that civil servants are accorded due processes and fairness in the exercise of disciplinary measures, especially in the termination of employment. In the situational analysis, the grievance of arbitrariness in disciplinary measures suffered by civil servants, especially those in senior positions was pointed out. Many key informants advocate return to legacy attribute of security of tenure and life-time (permanent) employment in a “professional” civil service. However, in The Gambia, as indeed in most other Governments around the World, these attributes have been progressively discarded ostensibly because they ultimately induce a laissez-faire, bureaucratic conduct and indiscipline in the civil service.

Table 4.5: Strategic Objective 4 Strategies, Initiatives and Key Target Outputs

Strategic Objective 4: To reinforce meritocracy, due process and professionalism in personnel administration					
Strategies	Strategic Initiatives	Key Target Results			Lead Agency
		Outputs	Year	Outcomes	
Pursue adequacy and effectiveness of the current institutional and administrative arrangements, statutes, rules, regulations and general orders in enabling and enforcing compliance with meritocratic principles and due process in the recruitment, deployment, selection for training, promotions and disciplining of personnel	Commission a comprehensive assessment of the adequacy and effectiveness of the current institutional and administrative arrangements for ensuring adherence to meritocratic principles and due processes in personnel administration	A comprehensive assessment to identify and explain gaps in adherence to meritocracy, due process and professionalism in personnel administration, and make recommendations and implementation plan	2019	Civil servants are on the whole satisfied that there is professionalism and fairness in personnel administration decisions	PMO & PSC
Systematically and continuously inform, educate and communicate (IEC) to all civil servants the necessity to observe the code of ethics and conduct and general orders	Develop an IEC programme targeting all civil servants	An IEC programme targeting all civil servants	2019	Civil servants are well aware of ethical standards and expected conduct	PMO & PSC
	Implement the IEC programme	Civil servants whom have benefited from the IEC programme	2019-2022	Reduced incidences of unethical conduct by civil servants	
Induct all new entrants into the public service on values, principles, statutes, rules and regulations	Develop and implement a programme of induction of new entrants into the civil service	A programme of induction of new entrants into the civil service in place	2019	Newly recruited employees aware of values, principles, statutes, rules and regulations	PMO & PSC
		New entrants into the civil service formally inducted	2020-2022		
Institute regular audit of public service executives and their respective MDAs on compliance with standards by a revamped Public Service Commission (PSC)	Undertake an assessment of the adequacy and effectiveness of the current PSC institutional and administrative capacities	Results of the assessment of adequacy of PSC institutional and administrative capacities	2018	All round improvements in personnel administration	PSC & PMO
	Review Public Service Act and Public Service Regulations to clarify PSC's oversight and inspection/audit mandate, regulations and procedures	Amendments to the Public Service Act presented to Parliament	2019		

Strategic Objective 4: <i>To reinforce meritocracy, due process and professionalism in personnel administration</i>					
Strategies	Strategic Initiatives	Key Target Results			Lead Agency
		Outputs	Year	Outcomes	
	Capacity building of PSC to undertake annual assessment of MDAs performance in personnel administration	Enhanced PSC capacity	2020		
	PSC undertakes annual assessment of MDAs' performance	Annual assessment MDAs by the PSC of compliance with personnel administration policies, rules and procedures	2021		

4.6 Strategic Objective 5: To accelerate improvements in service delivery by harnessing ICT

In recent years, the MOICI has taken initiatives to harness ICT to improve public service delivery. For example, the ministry has: (i) deployed ICT skilled personnel to MDAs; and (ii) supported various MDAs in installing websites and training personnel. At the time of developing this strategy, MOICI is spearheading the development of a current generation of data technology for cellular networks, i.e. the **Long Term Evolution (LTE)**, a highly technical system for high-speed data for phones and other mobile devices, which will support diversified ICT applications in public service delivery, including the IFMIS and the HRMIS. At present, these developments are not coordinated with the CSRP initiatives for public service delivery improvements. Under CSRP 2018-2027, the wider e-Government initiatives should be designed and implemented as integral to a “whole government approach” to improve public service delivery.


As elaborated in a text by Kariuki and Kiragu (2011), “ICT applications have evolved from tools to increase administrative effectiveness, cut costs and realize efficiencies in the public service, to being instruments for communication and stakeholder interactions...with the emergence of personal computers, the internet, electronic mail and intranet combined with the growth of client relationship management, and increased public demands for ‘service quality’ and new work methods, the scope of modernization of the public sector through the application of ICT expanded to electronic provision of government services and activities. In addition to network technologies, public administrations in SSA gradually began to use technologies such as: databases; tracing and tracking; desktops; and decision support systems. This rigorous use of ICT in the administration of government functions, for service provision, and to facilitate interactions with stakeholders is referred to as electronic government (e-government⁶)”.

Accordingly, in pursuit of the fifth CSRP 2018-2027 strategic objective, MOICI will, in full collaboration with PMO, champion e-Government services based on the three domains model that are suggested in **Figure 4.3**. The figure illustrates the key features of the three domains of e-government. It is noteworthy that each sphere targets particular stakeholders – so, for instance – electronic administration supports interactions: within and between ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs); and between government and its employees.

The strategies, initiatives and key target outputs associated with pursuit of Strategic Objective 5 are presented in **Table 4.6**.

⁶ Kariuki, E & Kiragu, K (2011): Modernizing Public Administration through e-Government; in Adamolekun, O (Ed) – Public Administration in Africa: Main Issues and Selected Country Studies, Second Edition. Evans Publishers, Ibadan.

Figure 4.3: The three domains of e-government



Source: Kariuki & Kiragu (2011)

Table 4.6: Strategic Objective 5 Strategies, Initiatives and Key Target Outputs

Strategic Objective 5: <i>To accelerate improvements in service delivery by harnessing ICT</i>					
Strategies	Strategic initiatives	Key target outputs	Year	Target outcomes	Lead agencies
Promote initiatives for ICT-based innovations in public service delivery by personnel in MDAs	Expose staff in PMO, MOICI and MDAs to good practices in ICT applications to improve service delivery (e.g. the one-stop service centres in Kenya)	A critical mass of officers with knowledge and inspiration to harness ICT for public service delivery	2019	Awareness and knowledge among civil servants of potential of ICT applications	MOICI, PMO & Individual MDAs
	Design a programme to promote e-government initiatives and innovations by both MDAs and individual public servants	Programme for promoting e-government initiatives and innovations by both MDAs and individual public servants	2019		
	Implement the programme for promoting e-government initiatives and innovations by both MDAs and individual public servants	MDAs and public servants taken through the programme for promoting e-government initiatives and innovations	2020-2022	Public service delivery improvements from ICT applications	
	Provide high-profile recognition awards for MDAs and individuals who launch innovative ICT applications to improve public service delivery	Innovations of ICT applications to improve service delivery launched	2021-2022		

4.7 Strategic Objective 6: To systematically close capacity gaps in the civil service

Under the CSRP 2012-2015, a service-wide training policy has been developed but has not yet been implemented. However, this policy does not reflect any rigorous service-wide training needs analysis, which would have been conducted to identify gaps in specific competencies for the different cadres in the service, including the needs of leadership and management level staff. Skills and other competencies specific to service delivery in the disparate sectors are the direct responsibility of the individual sectors/MDAs, and could be elements of sector development programmes and projects. CSRP capacity building will therefore focus on leadership and management competencies.

Effective leadership is, and will always be, a critical determinant of an organization's performance. Leadership powerfully influences an organisation's culture; what leaders do (rather than what they say), how they react in extreme or highly challenging situations; how and where they spend their time; how they allocate resources; and what they tolerate, encourage, and condemn, all have pervasive impact on the behaviour and performance of employees who work under their direction of supervision. Furthermore, effective leadership can overcome constraints in terms of financial resources, facilities, motivation, and indiscipline. Thus, for example, there is widespread anecdotal evidence that an MDA, a school, health facility, research centre, etc. with good leadership and management can often outperform another that has better endowment of physical facilities, financial resources and even personnel. To achieve the national development visions and plans, the public service leaders and managers will need to improve competencies and be more entrepreneurial, and they will need to work closer and better with the private sector and NGOs. In the latter context, capacity building must accord priority to implementing a programme geared to building leaders and managers of the public service who: (i) envision and initiate strategic changes, are entrepreneurial and enable the realisation of the national development goals, promulgated in the NDP; (ii) inspire, guide, and manage their organisations to improve service delivery; and (iii) demonstrate accountability, integrity and transparency.

To ensure sustainability of the results (outputs and outcomes) from the above measures, it will be important to install smart human resources planning practice, which the situational analysis shows to be a much neglected human resources management function. It is however unlikely that the capacity for HR planning is in place. Therefore, building HR planning capacity is a priority in this regard. Increased capacity in this area will enable civil service executives adopt a strategic orientation for making personnel decisions using a framework that demands: investigation; forecasting; planning; implementation; monitoring and evaluation.

HR planning will be complemented by periodic competency assessments to determine public officers' skills levels at a particular point in time against their relevant predetermined skills and competency profiles. The outcome of this exercise will inform the recruitment and staff development processes, and ensure that they are demand driven. HR planning and periodic assessment of competencies will therefore also inform the identification of both short and long-term training needs. Training will encompass both short and long-term interventions including, for example, qualification programmes for middle level executives, and short-term training and study tours for senior executives.

To cost-effectively and sustainably pursue the above strategic initiatives, it is envisaged that a revamped Management Development Institute (MDI) will be actively involved in the implementation. MDI will itself need to be developed, and this will be accorded priority among the strategic initiatives, which are presented in **Table 4.7**.

Table 4.7: Strategic Objective 6 Strategies, Initiatives and Key Target Outputs

Strategic Objective 6: <i>To systematically close capacity gaps in the civil service</i>					
Strategies	Strategic Initiatives	Key Target Results			Lead Agency
		Outputs	Year	Outcomes	
1. Develop leadership and managerial competencies of top, senior and middle-level executives in the public service	Develop leadership and management competency policy and a competency framework specific to the needs of The Gambia, and obtain Cabinet approval for roll-out	A leadership and managerial competency policy and a GOTG competency framework approved by the Cabinet	2020	Competency gaps among top, senior and middle level civil service executives reduced	PMO, PSC and MDI
	Install competency assessment centres (possibly beginning with MDI)	Number of competency assessment centres installed	2020		
	Assess all senior and middle-level civil service executives in leadership and management competencies (begin with a pilot in 3 MDAs)	Number of executives assessed for leadership and management competencies	2021	Higher frequency of quality policy proposals submitted by MDAs to the Cabinet	
	Develop and implement competency based leadership and management development programmes (responsive to the results of the competency assessments)	A programme to develop leadership and management, and policy analysis competencies for top and middle level executives	2022		
	Train and develop top and middle management in core leadership qualities of setting policy and strategy, achieving results, upholding core values, communicating internally, and collaborating externally.	Number of top and middle level executives trained	2022		
2. Build the capacity of The Gambia Public Service Management Development Institute (MDI)	Develop and implement a programme for the development of a The Gambia Public Service Management Development Institute (MDI)	Programme for development of the MDI approved by the PSRIDB	2018		
	Commission and support MDI to develop and implement leadership and management development programmes	Capacities/facilities built at the MDI	2019		

Strategic Objective 6: <i>To systematically close capacity gaps in the civil service</i>					
Strategies	Strategic Initiatives	Key Target Results			Lead Agency
		Outputs	Year	Outcomes	
3. Strengthen human resources planning	Build capacity to undertake human resource planning	Public service executives, (and especially HRM executives) trained in HR planning	2020		
	Promote human resources planning and multi -skill development, including succession planning by MDAs	Human resources plans in place	2020-2022		

5 Implementation Strategy and Action Plans

5.1 Implementation principles

Effective leadership, management and coordination will be critical to the successful implementation of the CSRP 2018-2027 Strategy. Many largely autonomous institutions will be involved in the implementation of the programme. They will need to be both led and coordinated. With regard to leadership, it is important to ensure both political and technical dimensions are effective. While a participatory approach will be emphasised, clarity of leadership and management responsibilities must be clearly defined and seen to be exercised from the outset. In the latter perspective, the implementation arrangements for the programme are based on the following principles:

- (a) **Effective participation of all the MDAs:** The results of many of the changes to the civil service system that are planned under the strategy will be realized at the level of individual MDAs. It is therefore crucial that all MDAs are adequately consulted and involved in the change processes;
- (b) **Mainstream programme coordination into PMO and MDAs' structures:** There is a wealth of documented evidence that the creation of temporary enclave project implementation units (PIUs) outside the existing Government administrative structures undermines: (i) ownership, commitment and accountability by the primary stakeholders to the programme goals and implementation responsibilities; and (ii) long-term capacity building which is critical to the sustainability of programme achievements. Therefore, the programme implementation responsibilities will be mainstreamed into the existing administrative structures in PMO and other MDAs;
- (c) **Fostering links with other reforms:** It is recognized that effective implementation of the CSR strategy hinges on increased effective coordination of the programme with such other reforms as PFMR and decentralizations, as well as the sector wide programmes. In this regard, the PMO leadership will be proactive in monitoring and influencing progress in the other areas of public sector reforms; and
- (d) **Government leadership in the coordination of the development partners' support:** Development partners will be important stakeholders in the implementation of the CSR Strategy. They will provide financial as well as technical resources that are critical to speedy and effective implementation of the strategy. At the same time, it is important that this external support does not crowd out ownership, responsibility and accountability by Government institutions. There is also the risk that without decisive leadership and coordination of the programme by the Government, the development partners' support could result in fragmentation of the reform efforts, loss of effective collaboration among the implementing agencies and sub-optimal use of external resources. PMO will technically lead the GOTG institutions in ensuring government leadership and coordination of the CSR Strategy implementation.

In the context of the above principles, the main features of the implementation plan for this strategy are presented below under the following headings:

- (i) Keeping the implementation governance framework of CSRP 2012-2015;
- (ii) Individual MDAs will have primary responsibility for reform results;
- (iii) Integrating CSR activities into Annual Work Plans and Budgets;
- (iv) Monitoring and Evaluation Arrangements;
- (v) PMO coordination, and Monitoring & Evaluation roles are critical;
- (vi) Building PMO's capacity;
- (vii) Change management; and
- (viii) Information, education and communication (IEC).

5.2 Keeping the implementation governance framework of CSRP 2012-2015

CSRP 2018-2027, will adopt the governance framework designed for the implementation of the CSRP 2012-2015, and which is illustrated in **Figure 5.1** over the page. At the apex of the is a Public Service Reform and Institutional Capacity Development Board (PSRICDB), which would provide strategic oversight within the context of the overall public sector reform agenda. At the next level is the Sub-Committee on Civil Service Reforms- which would provide strategic oversight within the context of the civil service environment only. There would be Senior Management Teams in the implementing Ministries. The Civil Service Reform Unit, a Directorate within the Personnel Management Office (Office of the President) would be the programme management coordinating arm and secretariat of the Sub-Committee on Civil Service Reforms.

5.3 Individual MDAs will have primary responsibility for reform results

MDAs will have the primary responsibility for implementation of key facets of the programme. Through annual work plans and budgets, MDAs will be able to bring into a common framework, all the elements of the reform envisaged in this strategy.


To successfully champion implementation in their respective MDAs, top leadership of each MDA (the Permanent Secretary and Directors) will also need to build an understanding of change management concepts, tools and tactics. The change management strategy (see 5.6 below), will provide for such capacity building interventions which adequately prepares them to plan, initiate, manage, reinforce and sustain change within their institutions.

5.4 Integrating CSR activities into Annual Work Plans and Budgets

For systematic, results-oriented and sustainable implementation, PMO and the other MDAs will need to integrate CSR activities into annual work plans and budgets. To this end, each MDA will pick-out the key target outputs from the strategy and disaggregate to intermediate outputs with shorter (annual, quarterly or monthly) SMART⁷ outputs and activities, and prepare budgets to implement on that basis. PMO has the responsibility, with the support of MOFEA, to monitor and evaluate how well the MDAs comply with this crucial dictate.

⁷SMART is a common acronym in planning, monitoring and evaluation to describe outputs; and stands for Specific, Measurable, Actionable, Realistic and Time bound.

Figure 5.1: Civil Service Reform Implementation Governance Framework



5.5 Monitoring and Evaluation Arrangements

PMO will have overall responsibility for coordinating and managing the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) framework for the CSR Strategy. M&E of the strategy will serve four purposes:

- a) Promote accountability by drawing on information on efficiency and effectiveness to assess and communicate whether the CSR Strategy is likely to or has realised its objectives;
- b) Inform and support the PMO during implementation;
- c) Draw lessons of experience in terms of understanding factors that have facilitated or inhibited the achievement of CSR Strategy objectives; and
- d) Aid communication by providing information and feedback both internally and externally.

Monitoring will be undertaken at two levels. At the primary level, PMO will monitor outputs and expenditure on various initiatives against work plans and budgets under each strategic objective. This monitoring activity will provide a basis for generating periodic reports for review within the year at the PSRICDB. The specific reporting formats to be used will be documented in an Operations Manual.

At the secondary level, PMO will half-yearly and annually monitor the CSR Strategy's implementation progress to the strategic objectives and key performance indicators specified in Chapter 6. To facilitate the latter process, PMO will need to collect baseline data for each indicator by deploying cost-effective data collection methods including use of surveys. The priority task will be to set time bound targets, and thereafter collect and track actual indicator values which provide a basis for evaluating performance over time. The results of the secondary level monitoring effort will provide a basis for reporting progress against policy actions and predetermined outputs extracted from this strategy document. Furthermore, the annual results will be reported in a CSRP 2018-2027 Annual Report which, which will present progress towards meeting the strategic objectives.

5.6 PMO in the pivotal roles and functions of Coordination, and Monitoring & Evaluation

The PMO will have overall responsibility and be accountable for the coordination and management of the programme's implementation functions. In discharging this role, The Permanent Secretary (PS) leads the Directors and other senior staff of the Office in coordinating, planning and budgeting for the strategy implementation. The PS will also report progress to the CSR Steering Committee.

It is noteworthy that under any situation, coordination of wide ranging change or development process is a particularly challenging undertaking for any organization, and even more so for one that ordinarily relies on bureaucratic authority. In the latter framework, i.e. when effectiveness of coordination is based on bureaucratic authority, emphasis of coordinating activities by PMO would be in flexing bureaucratic muscle and exerting control over the implementing MDAs. However, it is often the case that such control is resented and resisted, by recourse to both overt and covert techniques. In this regard, to be effective in its role, PMO will strive to establish its coordinating authority by building its organizational capacity and a culture of an effective non-bureaucratic coordinating agency. To the latter end, in brief, as the CSRP 2018-2027 implementation coordinating organ, PMO will:

- (i) Lead, advise and influence MDAs (as its coordination clients) on the basis of mastering comparative technical knowledge about public service delivery and improvements, and not through administrative authority;
- (ii) Not seek to control the initiatives and implementation activities of other key MDAs involved in CSR implementation, but rather relate to them as client institutions;
- (iii) Catalyse and ensure no inertia in performance of roles and implementation of mandates among the MDAs;
- (iv) Identify gaps in capacity and initiate action to close them;
- (v) Mobilize resources necessary to support the strategic initiatives, including capacity building, of all client-institutions; and
- (vi) Continually monitor and evaluate (M&E) as well as report on performance of all the MDAs. The results of such M&E will be the bedrock of its initiatives and accountability.

At present, PMO does not have adequate capacity to effectively discharge the technical leadership, coordination and management role envisaged above. There is evidence that PMO has been challenged in performance of its core role and functions. For example, it is the mandate and function of PMO to ensure optimal structures and staffing across Government. However, at present MDAs structures and systems are not consistent with building optimal structures and systems that are consistent with efficient and effective delivery of public services, as in the plans. At the same time, PMO does not have the necessary capacity to be effectively responsive to the needs for new structures and management systems as driven by sector development plans and MDAs strategic plans. Therefore, as expounded below, there will be measures taken under the programme to build PMO's capacity.

5.7 Building PMO's capacity

PMO needs to review, and if necessary reorganize its internal structure and staffing, so that it is effective in its implementation of technical leadership and implementing roles and functions. In this regard, every Division within PMO will be assigned a primary role to spearhead, coordinate, monitor and report on implementation of one or several components or sub-components of the CSRP 2018-2027 Strategy. Within PMO, the CSR and Planning Unit (CSRPU) will be responsible for:

- (i) Supporting the relevant Divisions within PMO to effectively discharge their roles and responsibilities, and on how to maintain broad support for the Strategy implementation, and to minimize resistance;
- (ii) Mobilize resources, undertake any centralized procurement and account for expenditures under its control;
- (iii) Agreeing annual work plans with the lead implementing agencies, including MDAs;
- (iv) Monitoring progress towards outputs and strategic objectives based on reports from programme managers;
- (v) Identifying, reviewing and managing implementation risks;
- (vi) Promoting pilot projects, capturing learning and sharing success widely throughout the public service;
- (vii) Evaluating the impact of the strategy on public service outcomes;
- (viii) Preparing and submitting reports to the CSR Steering Committee; and

- (ix) Leading the overall communications strategy, and providing advice and support to MDAs on communications tactics for particular reform initiatives.

To undertake the above responsibilities effectively, the CSRPU will need to have skills in programme management (planning, monitoring and evaluation), and communications. Staff skills in these areas will be reinforced, and where critical gaps need to be urgently closed, external technical assistance will be procured.

5.8 Change Management

In many respects, the strategic objectives set out in Chapter 3 reflect desired behavioural changes in The Gambian public service. The reform strategy therefore does not stop at the delivery of reform “outputs;” it is also concerned with how these “outputs” are translated into changes in the behaviour of both individual civil servants and the MDAs where they work. The question is how can behaviour be changed? To answer this question, it is a priority in CSRP 2018-2027 implementation that a change management strategy is designed and implemented.

In light of technical complexities, political sensitivities and paucity of resources, GOTG will not adopt a “big bang” approach to the implementation of the CSRP 2018-2027 Strategy. In such cases, PMO and other implementing agencies will be encouraged to adopt a piloting and learning approach.

5.9 Information, Education and Communication

An effective Information, Education and Communications (IEC) programme is an essential component of the implementation strategy. An IEC programme has twin objectives: firstly, to convey information to stakeholders; and secondly, to engage MDAs and civil servants in order to encourage their participation in reform initiatives where appropriate. The IEC strategy will be based on the information needs of different stakeholders, both within the public service and outside. Messages will be tailored to the particular needs of different stakeholder groups and delivered by their preferred messengers using appropriate media. A range of different methods will be considered including press releases, the internet, newsletters, workshops, discussion groups, radio and television. Public service leaders and executives will play a key role in communications, not simply by what they say, but by depicting the target behaviour changes expected of public servants through the reform programme.

5.10 Implementation strategies, initiatives and key target outputs

The strategic objective of the implementation strategy is to ensure the smoothness, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of the CSRP 2018-2027 implementation. **Table 5.1** presents the summary of implementation strategies, initiatives and key target outputs.

Table 5.1: Strategic Initiatives and Target Outputs

Key Strategies	Strategic Initiatives	Key Target Outputs
Develop and implement a programme to build the capacity of PMO	1. Review the current capacity of PMO to provide technical support/management advisory services to MDAs	A programme to build the capacity of PMO is developed and approved by the PSRICDB
	2. Build the capacity of PMO to implement the programme	Technical expertise and facilities installed in PMO
Develop and implement a change management strategy for CSRP 2018-2027	1. Develop a change management strategy to support the programme implementation	A change management strategy developed
	2. Implement the change management strategy	Top and senior civil servants taken through change management forums
Develop and implement an IEC programme	1. Design the IEC programme	IEC programme developed
	2. IEC programme implemented	IEC messages coming through various channels of communication
Continuous and effective monitoring and evaluation of the programme implementation	1. Prepare a M&E manual for the CSRP 2018-2027	M&E manual prepared
	2. Develop a programme to induct/train PMO and other MDAs personnel on CSRP 2018-2027, M&E instruments and reporting requirements	An M&E induction and training programme developed
	3. Implement the induction/training programme	Civil servants in PMO and MDAS inducted/trained in CSRP 2018-2027
	4. Implement the M&E arrangements	M&E reports presented to the PSRICDB

6 Results Monitoring and Evaluation, and Reporting Framework

The results monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and reporting framework for the CSRP 2018-2027 is comprehensively presented in the format of Table 6.1 below. The focus is on the target results, in terms of outputs and outcomes, and the results indicators and means of verification. These variables will be refined in the processes of annual planning and budgeting for implementation in the pursuit of specific target outputs, and on the basis of results of annual and mid-term evaluation of the programme implementation.

Table 6.1: Results Monitoring and Evaluation Framework

Overall Goal (Purpose) and Strategic Objectives	Key Target <u>Outputs</u> with Indicators and Means of Verification			Target <u>Outcomes</u> with Indicators and Means of Verification		
	Target Outputs	Result Indicator(s)	Means of Verification (MOV)	Target Outcome	Result Indicator(s)	Means of Verification (MOV)
Overall Goal: Quality public services delivered with professionalism, efficiency and effectiveness	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Improved professionalism, efficiency and effectiveness in public service delivery	% of citizens reporting satisfaction with civil servants performance.	Annual PMO survey of public survey of public service delivery
Strategic objective 1: To achieve optimal organization and staffing of the public service (excluding security organs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An inter-agency review team in place and commissioned to review and rationalize organization strategy of public sector. 	Circular of the secretary general /chairman of the PSRICDB appointing the team	Copy of circular	Clear delineation of roles and functions among MDAs	% of MDAs reporting that their structures and systems are “fit for purpose”	Annual PMO survey of MDAs and public servants
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rationalized institutional and organizational architecture and number of MDAs 	Reduction in the number of public sector entities.		MDAs have “fit for purpose” structures and strategy levels		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cabinet instructions imposing the freeze on employment except for critical positions 	Recommendations and instructions issued pending annual reviews of the freeze	SG publication of the results of rationalization			

Overall Goal (Purpose) and Strategic Objectives	Key Target <u>Outputs</u> with Indicators and Means of Verification			Target <u>Outcomes</u> with Indicators and Means of Verification		
	Target Outputs	Result Indicator(s)	Means of Verification (MOV)	Target Outcome	Result Indicator(s)	Means of Verification (MOV)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rationalized new structures and staffing levels overall and for every MDA 	Number of MDAs with new structures and staffing levels	M & E progress report	Effective payroll and wage bill control and enhanced fiscal sustainability	% savings on the wage bill attributable to the rationalization	Annual budget outturn (review) reports
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cost-benefit analysis of the rationalization plans 	Concrete figures of costs and benefits, and budgetary impact available				
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An operating HRMIS in the IFMIS platform 	Payroll produced from the IFMIS system	Physical verification of new payroll			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> System/process in place for transfer of relevant HRMIS data to the ERMS 	Data transferred from HRMIS to the ERMS	As above			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Select MDAs install advanced modules of the HRMIS 	Number of MDAs that have installed HRMIS modules	Implementation progress (M&E) reports			
Strategic objective 2: To attract, retain and motivate optimal numbers of technical and professional personnel into the civil service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Updated Task Force report On salary increases 	Report of the task force presented to the Cabinet	Implementation progress report	Improved morale of civil servants	% civil servants registering improved morale	Annual survey of civil servants by PMO
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Updated civil service pay reform strategy and policy 	Pay reform strategy and policy approved by cabinet	Implementation on progress report			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Survey of comparative pay in public sector and other sectors 	Survey reports presented by PMO to the PSRICDB	Implementation on progress report	Reduced gap between public and private sector pay for equivalent grades	% reduction in the pay gap	Independent /professional assessment of gap between public and private sector pay levels
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Study on the efficacy and sustainability and sustainability of the administrative and funding arrangements for the CSRLS 	Analysis report	Implementation on progress report	Efficacy and sustainability of the CSRLS enhanced	New and increased sources of long term funding of the scheme confirmed	Implementation on progress report

Overall Goal (Purpose) and Strategic Objectives	Key Target <u>Outputs</u> with Indicators and Means of Verification			Target <u>Outcomes</u> with Indicators and Means of Verification		
	Target Outputs	Result Indicator(s)	Means of Verification (MOV)	Target Outcome	Result Indicator(s)	Means of Verification (MOV)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Study recommendations implemented 	Recommendations presented to Cabinet	Extract of Cabinet minutes			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Annual adjustments in civil service pay and incentives levels 	% of annual adjustments in pay and incentives	Circular of adjustment of civil servants pay.	Improved morale of civil servants	% of civil servants reporting improved morale	Annual PMO survey of civil servants
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> New job grading structure approved by Cabinet 	A shorter structure of civil service job and grades	Extract of Cabinet minutes	Improved morale of civil servants	% of civil servants reporting improved morale	Annual PMO survey of civil servants
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Job evaluation and re-grading plans implemented 	Number of staff with new job grading	The payroll with new staff grades	Improved morale of civil servants	% of civil servants reporting improved morale	Annual PMO survey of civil servants
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review of current scheme of incentives for hard to work and risky work environments. 	New incentives identified to attract and retain civil servants in those areas	Circular by PMO or SG introducing the incentives	Increase in the number of personnel deployed in hard to reach and risky work areas/regions	% increase in the number	Annual PMO survey of civil servants
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved schemes for incentives to attract and retain personnel to serve in difficulty to work and risky environments 	Number of employees receiving the incentives	Extract of the payroll	Increase in the number of personnel deployed in hard to reach and risky work areas/regions	% increase in the number	Annual PMO survey of civil servants
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Periodic upward adjustments in public servants pensions benefits 	Revised scales of pension benefits	Pensioners' payroll	Improved living conditions and morale of pensioners	% of surveyed pensioners reporting improved livelihoods and morale	Annual PMO survey of civil servants
Strategic objective 3: To enhance discipline, ethical conduct and performance of civil servants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 					
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Programme for improved time management by public servants designed and implemented 	Civil servants monitored for punctuality and time spent at work place	Records kept (manual or electronic records)	The civil servants utilize their time productively	% of clients/citizens express satisfaction with time management by public servants at place of work	Annual survey of public service clients by PMO
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Performance contracting scheme endorsed by the 	Cabinet memo submitting the proposed scheme	Extract of Cabinet minutes	Improved performance by MDAs, especially in budget execution	% of MDAs reported to have satisfactory budget execution reports	Annual budget execution reports by MOFEA

Overall Goal (Purpose) and Strategic Objectives	Key Target <u>Outputs</u> with Indicators and Means of Verification			Target <u>Outcomes</u> with Indicators and Means of Verification		
	Target Outputs	Result Indicator(s)	Means of Verification (MOV)	Target Outcome	Result Indicator(s)	Means of Verification (MOV)
	Cabinet					
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MDAs educated and trained in the procedures 	No. of top and senior civil servants trained	Programme M&E reports	Top and senior civil service executives aware and knowledgeable of the performance contracting scheme	% of staff with satisfactory annual performance reports	Annual PMO survey of MDAs and public servants
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Performance contracts signed by Ministers and Permanent Secretaries 	No. of MDAs where performance contracts have been signed	Programme M&E reports	Citizens experience improved public service delivery/responsiveness	% of citizens reporting better experiences with public service delivery	Annual survey of citizens/clients (public service beneficiaries) by PMO
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Annual Assessments Against Performance Contract 	No. of MDAs assessed against performance contract terms	Programme M&E reports	Citizens experience improved public service delivery/responsiveness	% of citizens reporting better experiences with public service delivery	Annual survey of citizens/clients (public service beneficiaries) by PMO
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Annual performance recognition and awards event(s) 	Annual event of recognition and other awards (Public Service Day/Night)	Publicity of the event, before and after	Citizens experience improved public service delivery/responsiveness	% of citizens reporting better experiences with public service delivery	Annual survey of citizens/clients (public service beneficiaries) by PMO
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GOTG Electronic PMS system designed/procured and ready for implementation 	The electronic PMS system approved by the PSRICDB	Minutes of the PSRICDB	Timely and effective appraisal of MDAs and all their staff	% of civil servants appraised through the PMS	Annual survey of civil servants
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Electronic PMS rolled out in MDAs 	Number of MDAs covered by the new PMS system	M&E reports	Timely and effective appraisal of MDAs and all their staff	% of civil servants appraised through the PMS	Annual survey of civil servants
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Annual staff appraisals of the civil servants 	% of appraised with satisfactory performance	HRMIS statistics	Staff cognizant and appreciative that their performance appraisal is important	% of staffs stating that the performance appraisal process is supportive and motivating	Annual survey of public service clients by PMO
Strategic objective 4: To reinforce meritocracy, due process and professionalism in personnel administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Results of the assessment of current institutional arrangements and procedures 	Gaps in HR management by MDAs identified	Availability of the assessment results	Meritocracy, due process and fairness observed/experienced by civil servants	% civil servants satisfied with HR practices/reduced sense of insecurity	Annual PMO survey of civil servants

Overall Goal (Purpose) and Strategic Objectives	Key Target <u>Outputs</u> with Indicators and Means of Verification			Target <u>Outcomes</u> with Indicators and Means of Verification		
	Target Outputs	Result Indicator(s)	Means of Verification (MOV)	Target Outcome	Result Indicator(s)	Means of Verification (MOV)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Proposals for changes to Public Service Act 	Bill presented to Parliament	Gazette notice of the bill	Meritocracy, due process and fairness observed/experienced by civil servants	% civil servants satisfied with HR practices/reduced sense of insecurity	Annual PMO survey of civil servants
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PSC capacity building 	PSC has capacity to conduct annual assessments of MDAs	% of MDAs covered by PSC assessments	Meritocracy, due process and fairness observed/experienced by civil servants	% civil servants satisfied with HR practices/reduced sense of insecurity	Annual PMO survey of civil servants
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Annual assessments of MDAs by the PSC 	PSC has capacity to conduct annual assessments of MDAs	% of MDAs covered by PSC assessments	MDAs assessed to be complying with meritocratic principles due process and professionalism in HR Management	% of MDAs reported to be compliant	PSC Annual Report on the Assessments and CSRP M&E reports
Strategic objective 5: To accelerate improvements in public service delivery by harnessing ICT	A critical mass of officers with knowledge and inspiration to harness ICT for public service delivery	Numbers of officers distributed across MDAs trained	MOICI training returns	Awareness and knowledge among civil servants of potential of ICT applications	% of civil servants confirming satisfactory knowledge of ICT potential to improve public service delivery	Annual PMO survey of civil servants
	Programme for promoting e-government initiatives and innovations by both MDAs and individual public servants	Programme submitted for approval to the PSRIDB	Minutes of the PSRICB meetings			
	MDAs and public servants taken through the programme for promoting e-government initiatives and innovations	Number of officers trained in e-government initiatives	MOICI training returns			
	Innovations of ICT	Number and scope of the innovations in ICT	M&E reports	Public service	% of citizens expressing satisfaction with new	Annual survey of public service clients by PMO

Overall Goal (Purpose) and Strategic Objectives	Key Target <u>Outputs</u> with Indicators and Means of Verification			Target <u>Outcomes</u> with Indicators and Means of Verification		
	Target Outputs	Result Indicator(s)	Means of Verification (MOV)	Target Outcome	Result Indicator(s)	Means of Verification (MOV)
	applications to improve service delivery launched	applications launched		delivery improvements from ICT applications	service delivery modalities	
Strategic objective 6: To systematically close capacity gaps in the civil service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Programme for promoting e-government initiatives and innovations by both MDAs and individual public servants designed and launched 	PSRICDB approval of the system	Minutes of PSRICDB meetings	Cases of public service delivery through ICT applications	No. of new cases documented every year	M&E progress reports, and case studies
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Senior public servants taken through the programme for promoting e-government initiatives and innovations 	No. of civil servants trained on e-government initiatives and innovations	M&E reports	Cases of public service delivery through ICT applications	No. of new cases documented every year	M&E progress reports, and case studies
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Guidelines for CwCs developed 	Guidelines approved by the PSRICDB	M&E reports	Citizens aware of civil service responsibilities and service delivery CwCs	% civil servants aware and knowledgeable	Annual PMO survey of citizens
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Public servants trained on the guidelines 	No. of civil servants trained	M&E reports	Citizens aware of civil service responsibilities and service delivery CwCs	% civil servants aware and knowledgeable	Annual PMO survey of citizens
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CwCs produced by MDAs 	No. of MDAs producing CwCs	M&E reports	Citizens aware of civil service responsibilities and service delivery CwCs	% civil servants aware and knowledgeable	Annual PMO survey of citizens
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Competency assessment centers operational (at MDI) 	No. of competency assessment centres effectively launched	M&E reports	Leaders and managers of the civil service have requisite competencies	% of leaders and managers who meet the levels of competencies for their roles	Annual PMO survey of MDAs and public servants
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A leadership and management competency framework designed and approved 	Competency framework approval by the PSRICDB	M&E reports	Leaders and managers of the civil service have requisite competencies	% of leaders and managers who meet the levels of competencies for their roles	Annual PMO survey of MDAs and public servants

7 Costs Estimates, Budget and Financing

7.1 Costs estimates by strategic objectives and costs categories for Phase 1

A summary of costs estimates by strategic objectives of the first phase of CSRP 2018-2022 are presented in **Table 7.1**. The total costs for the five years are estimated at US Dollars 4.958 million.

Table 7.1: Summary of Costs Estimates by Strategic Objectives and Costs Categories, 2018-2022
(Amounts in US Dollars)

Strategic Objective	Facilitation & Operation Costs	TA & Consultancy	Training	Equipment & systems	Motor vehicles	Publishing & materials	IEC & stakeholders participation	Miscellaneous	Total
To achieve optimal organization and staffing of the public service	114,000	390,000	400,000	5,000	-	-	-	-	909,000
To attract, retain and motivate optimal numbers of technical and professional personnel	78,000	300,000	-	-	-	-	-	20,000	398,000
To enhance discipline, ethical conduct and high performance of civil servants	94,000	170,000	400,000	100,000	-	150,000	100,000	80,000	1,094,000
To re-institutionalize meritocracy, due process and professionalism in personnel administration	95,000	75,000	-	-	-	75,000	85,000	50,000	380,000
To accelerate improvements in public service delivery through ICT applications	-	-	200,000	300,000	-	-	-	-	500,000
To systematically identify and sustainably close capacity gaps in the civil service	60,000	200,000	27,000	150,000	-	-	-	110,000	547,000
To achieve timely, efficient and effective Programme implementation	-	530,000	100,000	100,000	200,000	50,000	100,000	50,000	1,130,000
Total	441,000	1,665,000	1,127,000	655,000	200,000	275,000	285,000	310,000	4,958,000

The above costs estimates do not include the following:

- i) The funding of the Civil Servants Revolving Loan Scheme (CSRLS);
- ii) The increases in Wage bill payments that will arise from implementation of the civil service pay reform policy;
- iii) The pensions funding associated with implementation of the civil service pensions reform policy;
- iv) The costs likely to arise in the implementation of rationalization of structures and staffing.

Table 7.2 shows that the largest allocation (23%) by strategic objective will go into ensuring timely, efficient and effective implementation of the programme. The third and first strategic objectives account for the next two highest allocations, at 22% and 18%, respectively.


**Table 7.2: Percentage Distribution of Costs Estimates by Strategic Objectives, FYs2018-2022
(Amounts in US Dollars)**

Strategic Objective	Facilitation & Operation Costs	TA & Consultancy	Training	Equipment & systems	Motor vehicles	Publishing & materials	IEC & stakeholders participation	Miscellaneous	Total
To achieve optimal organization and staffing of the public service	26%	23%	35%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	18%
To attract, retain and motivate optimal numbers of technical and professional personnel	18%	18%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	6%	8%
To enhance discipline, ethical conduct and high performance of civil servants	21%	10%	35%	15%	0%	55%	35%	26%	22%
To re-institutionalize meritocracy, due process and professionalism in personnel administration	22%	5%	0%	0%	0%	27%	30%	16%	8%
To accelerate improvements in public service delivery through ICT applications	0%	0%	18%	46%	0%	0%	0%	0%	10%
To systematically identify and sustainably close capacity gaps in the civil service	14%	12%	2%	23%	0%	0%	0%	35%	11%
To achieve timely, efficient and effective Programme implementation	0%	32%	9%	15%	100%	18%	35%	16%	23%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Technical assistance and consultancies constitute the largest cost category, as illustrated in **Figure 7.1**. It is noteworthy that about a third of these costs (32%) is targeted at supporting the PMO so that it has the capacity to effectively pursue the strategic objective of ensuring timely, efficient and effective implementation

of the programme. More than a half of all technical assistance (55%) is accounted for by the latter strategic objective and the first one, i.e. to achieve optimal organization and staffing of the public service (see **Table 7.2**).

Figure 7.1: Summary of Costs Estimates by Strategic Objectives and Costs Categories (Amounts in US Dollar)



7.2 Programme budget by strategic objectives and by Fiscal Years 2018-2022

Table 7.3 presents the summary budget of the programme costs by strategic objective and for each of the FYs in 2018-2022. High spending is anticipated in the initial two years of the programme implementation because a large proportion of the inputs are required to effectively launch the programme implementation. However, the GOTG budget for FY 2016 does not provide for the funding of the CSRPs any close to the budget figures in this Table. GOTG anticipates that development partners will substantially fund the programme. However, development projects to that end have not yet been negotiated with the development partners. Therefore, this budget table will need to be revised when development partner supports as well as the GOTG revised budget allocation are confirmed.

Table 7.3: Summary of Budget by Strategic Objectives and by FYs 2018-2022
(Amounts in US Dollars)

Strategic Objective	FY2018	FY2019	FY 2020	FY2021	FY2022	Total
To achieve optimal organization and staffing of the public service	472,000.00	283,000.00	118,000.00	18,000.00	18,000.00	909,000
To attract, retain and motivate optimal numbers of technical and professional personnel	114,000.00	274,000.00	10,000.00	-	-	398,000
To reinstate discipline, ethical conduct and high performance of civil servants	274,000.00	125,000.00	441,667.00	176,667.00	76,666.00	1,094,000
To re-institutionalize meritocracy, due process and professionalism in personnel administration	25,000.00	230,000.00	55,000.00	35,000.00	35,000.00	380,000
To accelerate improvements in public service delivery through ICT applications	-	100,000.00	33,334.00	183,333.00	183,333.00	500,000
To systematically identify and sustainably close capacity gaps in the civil service	90,000.00	100,000.00	218,000.00	48,000.00	91,000.00	547,000
To achieve timely, efficient and effective Programme implementation	643,334.00	353,333.00	133,333.00	-	-	1,130,000
Total	1,618,334	1,465,333	1,009,334	461,000	403,999	4,958,000
Percentage of Total	33%	30%	20%	9%	8%	100%

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Strategy Development Team

	NAME	DESIGNATION	INSTITUTION
1	Pateh Jah	Deputy Permanent Secretary	PMO
2	Abdoulie Bah	Deputy Permanent Secretary	Office of the Vice President
3	Oulaye Camara	Deputy Permanent Secretary	Ministry of Justice
4	Jerreh Sanyang	Deputy Permanent Secretary	Ministry of Higher Education, Research, Science & Technology
5	Mansata M. Darboe	Secretary	Public Service Commission
6	Amie Njie	Director	PMO
7	Musa Camara	Director	PMO
8	Abdoulie Jafuneh	Director	PMO
9	Pa Majagne Ndow	Director	National Audit Office
10	Elizabeth Bahoum	Director	National Records Service
11	Janko Jimbara	Director (Human Resources)	Ministry of Health & Social Welfare
12	Amadou Jawo	Deputy Head of Mission	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
13	Yemesrach A. Workie	Senior Economist	UNDP
14	Abdoulie K.M. Jallow	Principal Assistant Secretary	Ministry of Lands & Regional Government
15	Amath Tijan Jobe	Principal Assistant Secretary	Ministry of Energy
16	Yankuba Jah	Principal Assistant Secretary	Ministry of Tourism & Culture
17	Anna Jobe	Principal Assistant Secretary	Ministry of Youth & Sports
18	Moussa Ba	Principal Accountant	Accountant General's Department
19	Sheriff Jallow	Senior Personnel Officer	PMO
20	Ousman Bojang	Senior Economist	Ministry of Trade, Industry,

			Regional Integration & Employment
21	Yira Jammeh	Senior Assistant Secretary	Ministry of Petroleum
22	Isatou Jallow	Senior Assistant Secretary	Ministry of Basic & Secondary Education
23	Sheikh A. Jah	Personnel Officer	PMO
24	Sulayman Gaye	Planner	Ministry of Transport, Works & Infrastructure
25	Fatou K. Jeng	Assistant Secretary	Ministry of Fisheries
26	Yamarie Bojang	ICT Officer	Ministry of Information & Communication Infrastructure
27	Bakutubo Kanteh	Accountant	PMO
28	Ansumana Manneh	Staff Officer	Ministry of Interior
29	Haddy Jatou Njie	Cadet Administrative Officer	Ministry of Environment, Climate Change, Water Resources, Parks & Wildlife
30	Olimatou S. Deen Sarr	Business Development Officer	Gambia Chamber of Commerce & Industry
31	Fulaymata Batchily	Administrative Officer	National Youth Service Scheme

Appendix 2: Key Informants Interviewed⁸

Name of the Interviewee	Position Held	Organization/Stakeholder Represented
Ms Nancy A. Niang	Permanent Secretary	Office of the President and Ministry of Women Affairs
Mr Dawda D Fadera	Permanent Secretary	Personnel Management Office
Mr. Abdoullé Jallow	Permanent Secretary	Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
Dr Sherrifo Bojang	Permanent Secretary (Technical)	Ministry of Agriculture
Mr Lamin Camara	Permanent Secretary	Ministry of Information, Communication and Infrastructure (MOICI)
Mr Patel Jah	Deputy Permanent Secretary	Personnel Management Office (PMO)
Mrs Saffie Lowe Ceesay	Deputy Permanent Secretary	Finance & Administration, PMO
Mrs Amie Njie	Director	CSR Unit, PMO
Mr Musa Camara	Director	Management Services Division, PMO
Mr Sheikh Jah	Program Officer	CSR Unit, PMO
Mr. Abdoulie Jafunheh	Principal Personnel Officer	HRS, PMO
Mr. Baboucarr Sarr	Senior Personnel Officer	PMD, PMO
Mr Sheriff Jallow	Senior Personnel Officer	PMD, PMO
Mr Bai Madi Ceesay	Director of Budget	MOFEA
Mr Lamin Fatty	Deputy Director of Budget	MOFEA
Mr Alagie Fadera	Director of Planning	MOFEA
Mr Alaye Barra	Senior Loans Officer	MOFEA
Mr Ibrahim MBS Kinteh	Principal Planning Officer	MOFEA
Mr Isatou Camara	Principal Planning Officer	MOFEA
Ms Filly Suso	Planner	MOFEA
Mr Ibrahim Sisawo	Deputy Permanent Secretary	Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education
Mr Ousman Ceesay	Principal Assistant Secretary	Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education
Mr G.O. Bright	Chairman	Public Service Commission (PSC)
Mrs Awa Jowl-Auber	Vice-Chairperson	PSC
Mr Alhaji W. Joof	Commissioner	PSC
Mr Ibrahim T.A.S. Dondé	Commissioner	PSC
Mr Alieu B. Jallow	Commissioner	PSC
Mrs Mansata M. Darboe	Commissioner	PSC
Mr Alhaji W Joof	Commissioner	PSC
Mr Sanusi Drammeh	ICT Officer	MOICI
Mr Abdou Touray	Program Specialist, Policies	UNDP
Mrs Yemesrach Workie	Senior Economic Adviser	UNDP
Mr Bashirou Garba Johumpa	Program Specialist, Governance	UNDP
Mr Ousman Yabo	Executive Director	TANGO
Ms Jocelyn Mali	Economist and Programme Manager	European Union
Gaston K. Mpatswe	Resident Representative	IMF
Rupert James Leighton	Deputy Representative	UNICEF

⁸The then Minister of Presidential Affairs, Secretary General & Head of the Civil Service was also interviewed (November 2015).

Appendix 3: Select References

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Appendix 4: Subvented Agencies and Budgeting Transfers 2013 – 2017

Budget Entity and or MDA	Sub-vented Institution					
		2013	2014	2015	2016	May-17
		PE & OC	PE & OC			PE & OC
Office of the President	Management Development Institute	3,500,000	3,500,000.00	3,499,999.92	3,499,999.92	3,750,000.00
	National Council for Civic Education	2,000,000	3,000,000.00	3,991,582.92	3,991,582.92	1,663,159.55
	National Drug Enforcement Agency	32,000,000	45,000,000.00	68,464,171.92	72,000,000.00	32,500,000.00
	National Planning Commission	-	-	-	-	-
	Office of Ex- President	5,000,000	5,000,000.00	5,400,000.00	5,400,000.00	2,250,000.00
	Office of the First Ladies against Aids	2,000,000	-	-	-	-
	National Environment Agency	3,000,000		27,039,000.00		11,266,250.00
	National Aids Secretariat	5,000,000	5,000,000.00	5,250,000.00	5,500,000.00	6,125,000.00
	National Disaster Management Agency	5,600,000	7,198,317.87	6,868,152.00	6,868,152.00	2,861,730.00
	National Nutrition Agency -NANA	3,000,000	3,000,000.00	3,000,000.00	3,000,000.00	1,750,000.00
	Competition Commission	-	-	-	-	-
	Support to CRS Program	500,000				

Others	Commission for Refugees	630,000	-	-	-	-
	National Search Rescue Commission	1,000,000	-	-	-	-
	Small Arms and Light Weapons	318,000	-	-	-	-
	Senegal-Gambia Secretariat	10,000,000	-	-	-	-
	Special Service	18,500,000				
	President International Award	1,000,000	2,270,122.17	3,749,275.04	3,526,152.36	4,066,921.82
	Kanilia Academy	2,000,000	-	-	-	-
	Paramount Chief	700,000	868,900.00	367,200.00	867,200.00	183,600.00
	Gambia Anti-Corruption	-	-	-	-	-
	NCAC	3,000,000	3,000,000.00	3,000,000.00	3,500,000.00	1,500,000.00
	National Population Commission	1,500,000	-	-	-	-
Ministry of Tourism & Culture	National Arts and Culture	-	3,952,705.00	3,521,911.00	4,196,579.32	2,329,472.00
	Gambia Tourism Board former (Tourism Authority)	3,600,000	950,000.00	300,000.00	4,889,625.50	450,000.00
Ministry of Judiciary & Justice	Alternative Dispute Resolution Secretariat- ADRC	4,500,000	4,023,120.32	5,497,004.60	5,295,638.00	3,058,992.50
	National Council for legal Aid	3,000,000				

			3,000,000.00	4,250,000.00	4,800,000.00	2,000,000.00
	National Council for Law reporting	2,000,000	959,514.00	767,684.00	936,000.00	485000
	The Gambia law school	2,000,000	2,000,000.00	2,445,000.00	2,445,000.00	1,018,750.00
	National Agency against Trafficking in Person	1,500,000	2,471,000.00	2,616,764.98	2,584,062.66	1,617,333.31
	Law Reforms	-	-	-	-	-
	Office of the Ombudsman	-	12,381,720.00	14,236,565.00	17,059,108.54	4,396,002.32
	National Training Authority	-	-	-	-	-
	Judicial Services Commission	100,000	-	-	-	-
Ministry of Finance	Gambia Revenue Authority	155,000,000	195,650,000.00	286,067,400.00	319,200,000.00	145,000,000.00
	Gambia Public Procurement Authority	9,000,000		6,600,000.00	21,600,000.00	9,000,000.00
	Gambia Bureau of Statistics	16,000,000	20,000,000.00	30,000,000.00	30,000,000.00	12,500,000.00
	Social Development Funds	4,000,000	9,000,000.00	19,000,000.00	15,200,000.00	11,400,000.00
	Major Tender Board	-		3,000,000.00	3,000,000.00	1,250,000.00
	PROPAG	-	-	-	-	-
	Gambia Divestiture Agency	-	-	-	-	-
Ministry of Trans. Works &	National Roads Authority		18,000,000.00	21,000,000.00	21,000,000.00	10,000,000.00

Infras.	Gambia Maritime Administration	6,000,000	-	-	-	-
	Road Fund	-	-	-	-	-
	Maritime Academy	70,000	-	-	-	-
	Gambia Competition Commission	8,000,000	13,772,586.98	9,455,058.30	11,808,225.17	6,141,645.04
	GIPFZA/ Gambia Investment and Export Promotion Agency	20,000,000	25,485,871.00	21,956,519.48	23,782,631.17	10,756,832.24
	Gambia Standards Bureau	6,000,000	7,585,818.00	6,466,998.52	8,400,000.00	5,900,000.00
	Indigenous Business Advisory-Credit Fund	-	-	-	-	-
	National Enterprise Development	2,500,000	2,302,202.99	2,321,349.66	1,246,853.92	891,188.00
Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education	FAWEGAM	120,000	211,033.26	666,666.68	1,297,499.98	97,274.99
	WAEC	14,000,000	12,000,000.00	12,000,000.00	12,000,000.00	5,000,000.00
	National Library	2,354,547	25,000,000.00	40,050,000.00	59,520,000.00	2,480,000.00
	UNESCO	1,227,000	3,250,000.00	5,250,000.00	6,236,400.00	2,598,500.00
	30 Senior Secondary School	133,468,164	165,000,000.00	199,000,000.00	238,860,000.00	99,525,000.00
Ministry of	All Hospitals	58,500,000				

Health & Social Welfare			95,500,000.00	168,500,000.00	195,000,000.00	112,550,000.00
	Councils (MDC, NMC, Pharmacist)	450,000	-	-	-	-
	Boards (Health and Medicines)	250,000	-	-	-	-
	Riders for Health	30,000,000	77,585,030.50	65,500,000.00	78,500,000.00	44,000,000.00
Ministry of H/Edu. Research, Sci. &Tech	University of The Gambia	-	41,738,915.05	34,312,311.76	44,442,758.46	11,590,000.00
	Gambia College	2,500,000	28,149,355.39	34,828,691.44	29,889,530.72	13,430,546.00
	Gambia Technical Training Institute	-	13,396,549.61	17,352,142.10	16,996,585.07	8,583,773.48
	Sheikh Zayed Regional Eye Care	4,500,000	10,500,000.00	12,000,000.00	24,650,000.00	9,805,000.00
Ministry of Youth and Sports	Independent Stadium	1,000,000	6,772,124.82	1,881,928.00	2,578,980.02	1,123,369.75
	NYSS (National Youth Support Service)	4,000,000	4,680,556.00	3,703,083.25	2,395,181.38	4,190,094.68
	National Sports Council	1,000,000	4,051,287.02	4,064,627.66	2,454,064.56	1,459,491.00
	National Youth Council	1,000,000	4,115,811.61	2,923,493.24	12,672,640.20	934,534.00
Total	597,887,711		891,322,541.59	1,172,164,581.47	1,333,090,451.87	612,994,460.68